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Abstract
Intelligent Malware Detection Using File-to-file Relations and
Enhancing its Security against Adversarial Attacks
Lingwei Chen
With computing devices and the Internet being indispensable in people’s everyday
life, malware has posed serious threats to their security, making its detection of ut-
most concern. To protect legitimate users from the evolving malware attacks, machine
learning-based systems have been successfully deployed and offer unparalleled flexibility
in automatic malware detection. In most of these systems, resting on the analysis of
different content-based features either statically or dynamically extracted from the file
samples, various kinds of classifiers are constructed to detect malware. However, besides
content-based features, file-to-file relations, such as file co-existence, can provide valuable
information in malware detection and make evasion harder. To better understand the
properties of file-to-file relations, we construct the file co-existence graph. Resting on
the constructed graph, we investigate the semantic relatedness among files, and leverage
graph inference, active learning and graph representation learning for malware detection.
Comprehensive experimental results on the real sample collections from Comodo Cloud
Security Center demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed learning paradigms.
As machine learning-based detection systems become more widely deployed, the
incentive for defeating them increases. Therefore, we go further insight into the arms
race between adversarial malware attack and defense, and aim to enhance the security
of machine learning-based malware detection systems. In particular, we first explore
the adversarial attacks under different scenarios (i.e., different levels of knowledge the
attackers might have about the targeted learning system), and define a general attack
strategy to thoroughly assess the adversarial behaviors. Then, considering different skills
and capabilities of the attackers, we propose the corresponding secure-learning paradigms
to counter the adversarial attacks and enhance the security of the learning systems
while not compromising the detection accuracy. We conduct a series of comprehensive
experimental studies based on the real sample collections from Comodo Cloud Security
Center and the promising results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed secure-
learning models, which can be readily applied to other detection tasks.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Malware (e.g., viruses, worms, trojans, backdoors, botnets, ransomware) is mal icious
software that is disseminated by attackers as a major weapon to launch a wide range
of security attacks, such as disturbing system operations, stealing personal sensitive
information without user’s permission, hijacking devices remotely to deliver massive
spam emails, or infiltrating user’s online account credentials [144]. With computing
devices and the Internet being essential in everyday life, malware poses serious and
evolving threats to their security, which present various damages and significant financial
loss to Internet users. A study conducted by Kaspersky Lab revealed that nearly half
of Internet users have encountered malicious software, in which 80% malware attacks
caused problems for the users [74]. It’s also reported that up to one billion dollars were
stolen in roughly two years from financial institutions worldwide, due to malware attacks
[73]. As a result, the detection of malware is of major concern to both the anti-malware
industry and scientific research community.
In order to combat the evolving malware attacks and protect legitimate users from
these threats, most malware detection systems in computing devices, especially anti-
malware software products (e.g., Symantec, Kaspersky, Comodo), typically use the
signature-based method [49]. A signature is a short sequence of bytes unique to each
known malware, which allows newly encountered files to be correctly identified with a
small error rate [75]. However, driven by economic benefits, today’s malware are cre-
ated at a rate of hundreds of thousands per day [149] (i.e., more than 260 million new
malware samples were created last two year [4]). Meanwhile, malware attackers easily
evade this method through techniques such as obfuscation, polymorphism, metamor-
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phism, and encryption [119]. In order to remain effective, new and intelligent malware
detection techniques need to be investigated. As a result, many research efforts have
been conducted on applying machine learning techniques for intelligent malware detec-
tion [140, 7, 90, 139, 142, 95, 60, 39, 67, 68, 151, 131, 132, 137, 69]. In these systems,
based on different feature representations (e.g., binary n-grams [7], system call graphs
[101, 67], dynamic behaviors [49, 132], or Application Programming Interface (API) call
blocks [68]), various kinds of classification approaches, such as support vector machine
[153, 79, 44, 114], random forest [1] and deep neural network [68, 67, 60], are used for
model construction to detect malicious files, which have offered unparalleled flexibility
in intelligent malware detection.
Figure 1.1: File relations between a
Downloader-Trojans and its related Tro-
jans [149]
Figure 1.2: File relations between a be-
nign application and its related dynamic
link files [149]
Most of the existing systems using machine learning techniques merely utilize local
features either statically or dynamically extracted from the file samples to detect mal-
ware. As the moral says “man is known by the company he keeps”, in malware detection,
a file’s goodness or malice may be judged by the other files that are always associated
with it in the different ways. For example, Ye et al. [149] first proposed to utilize file
relations for malware detection: as shown in Figure 1.1, we can observe that a Trojan-
Downloader “yy(1).exe”, which can download and install multiple unwanted applications
(e.g., trojan, adware) from remote servers, is associated with many trojans which are
marked as purple color; from Figure 1.2, we can observe that a benign system diagnostic
application “everest.exe”, is associated with different benign files marked in green color.
Ignoring the relations among file samples is a significant limitation of current malware
detection methods. Recently, features beyond file content are starting to be leveraged to
curb the security threats that malware poses [149, 25, 121, 72], such as machine-to-file
relations [25] and file-to-file relations (e.g., file co-existence) [149, 121], which provide
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invaluable insight about the properties of file samples [149]. However, much needs to
be done to take full advantage of the relationships of malware and benign files (i.e.,
malware-malware, malware-benign, benign-benign relations). To better understand the
properties of file-to-file relations, we’d like to take a further step to delve deeper into the
relationship characteristics of malware and benign files.
Meanwhile, as machine learning-based detection systems become more widely de-
ployed, the adversary incentive for defeating them increases [144]. More specifically,
machine learning itself may open the possibility for an adversary who maliciously “mis-
trains” a classifier (e.g., by changing data distribution or feature importance) in a
malware detection system. When the learning system is deployed in a real-world en-
vironment, it is of a great interest for malware attackers to actively manipulate the
data to make the classifier produce minimum true positive (i.e., maximally misclas-
sifying malware as benign), using some combination of prior knowledge, observation,
and experimentation [38]. If we look at the evolution of malware detection techniques
[49, 119, 101, 39, 25, 149, 60], malware attackers and anti-malware defenders are actu-
ally engaged in a never-ending arms race. At each round, both the malware attackers
and defenders analyze the vulnerabilities of each other, and develop their own optimal
strategies to overcome the opponents [14], which has led to considerable countermea-
sures of variability and sophistication between attackers and defenders. For example,
when signature-based methods prevailed in malware detection, attackers began to use
code obfuscation and encryption to bypass the detection and defeat attempts to analyze
their inner mechanisms [77, 67]. Currently, the issues of understanding machine learning
security in adversarial settings [152] are starting to be leveraged, from either adversarial
[87, 38, 126, 14, 13] or defensive [152, 127, 40, 11, 15] perspectives. However, the appli-
cation of adversarial machine learning into malware detection domain has been scarce.
With machine learning techniques prevailing in malware detection, such adversaries will
become even more outrageous.
1.2 Research Goals
With the above limitations and challenges addressed for intelligent malware detec-
tion, in this Ph.D. dissertation, we focus on investigating file-to-file relations to facilitate
analysis of malware detection, and exploring the adversarial machine learning to en-
hance the security of malware detection. Specifically, we describe these research goals
(RG1-RG2 ) in detail as follows:
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• RG1: Intelligent malware detection utilizing file-to-file relations: To achieve our
research goals, we construct the file co-existence graphs between malware and be-
nign files, and analyze effective graph-based feature representations and relation-
ship characteristics (e.g., mutual influence and difference importances among the
files) for intelligent malware detection. Since feeding the graph-based features to
the traditional machine learning-based classifiers is an inferior fashion for malware
detection, which is incapable of depicting the file-to-file relations, a well designed
graph inference framework or graph representation learning framework should be
proposed to make the best use of graph structure, and manage to propagate the
mutual information between malware and benign files in the constructed relation-
ship graphs to promote the optimal solution for file labeling.
• RG2: Enhancing security of machine learning-based malware detection: In the
arms race between malware attackers and defenders, they utilize the vulnerabilities
of each other and implement their optimal strategies to overcome the opponents.
To be resilient against the malware attacks, we analyze the general adversarial
strategy to facilitate assessing the security of the classifier. Accordingly, we present
several secure-learning paradigms to counter adversarial attacks. To be feasible in
practical use for malware detection, in these paradigms, we formulate some models
based on the attackers’ skills and capabilities, while others are independent from the
knowledge about the structure of the data (e.g., adversarial examples) or the attack
model, which are adaptive to all potential attacks without exhibiting significant
evidence of manipulation.
1.3 Contributions of This Dissertation
In this dissertation, to address the aforementioned research problems, we conduct
feasibility studies, propose different learning methods for intelligent malware detection
and adversarial machine learning, and develop the corresponding systems that integrate
our proposed methods. The contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We utilize file-to-file relations for intelligent malware detection through construct-
ing file co-existence graph construction, designing graph-based features to charac-
terize the semantic relatedness among them, and proposing graph learning frame-
work to detect malware, which have resulted in 4 publications [31, 27, 66, 143].
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– Deep analysis of file-to-file relation graphs: Different from file content based
detection, we analyze and utilize the relations among file samples (i.e., co-
existences of the files) collected from the user clients to construct file relation
graph for malware detection. The newly unknown malware can be detected
by its association with the known files (benign or malicious). (See Section 3.1
for details).
– Design enhanced Belief Propagation (EBP) algorithm for unknown file label-
ing: Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm is a promising method for solving
inference problems over graphs and it has also been successfully used in many
domains (e.g., computer vision, coding theory) [150]. However, in our appli-
cation, the algorithm should be greatly adapted, which is not a trivial process:
we fine tune various components used in the algorithm and carefully design the
message update and belief read-out functions for malware detection [31, 66]
(See Section 3.2 for details).
– Build effective active learning framework for malware detection: Based on
the constructed file-to-file relation graph, we design five graph-based features
to represent each file and further analyze its relationship characteristics and
have two significant findings: Finding 1: A file can greatly inherit the indirect
influences from other files. Finding 2: (1) The importance of each file is
different; (2) The neighbors of the important malware are associated through
it, while the neighbors of the non-important malicious file are inclined to be
a clique. We also use graph metrics to quantitatively validate these findings.
Accordingly, we first apply Malicious Score Inference Algorithm (MSIA) to
select the representative samples from the large unknown file collection for
labeling, and then use EBP algorithm to detect malware [27] (See Section 3.3
for details).
– Leverage Long Short-term Memory for graph representation learning: To learn
the representations of files in our constructed graph, we first generate file se-
quences based on the random walk, and then deploy Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) for file sequence modeling and thus learn desirable file representations
over graph, which will be fed to a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to train
the classification model, based on which the unlabeled file can be predicted if
they are malicious or not (See Section 3.4 for details).
• We explore the arms race between adversarial malware attack and defense to en-
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hance the security of machine learning-based detection systems through analyzing
adversarial attacks, and formulating secure-learning paradigms to counter the ad-
versarial attacks. Our work on adversarial machinle learning in malware detection
has resulted in 5 publications [32, 33, 28, 29, 30].
– Analyze adversarial attacks under different scenarios: The attackers may have
different levels of knowledge of the learning system [126]. We explore the
adversarial attacks corresponding to the different scenarios, thoroughly assess
the adversary behaviors through feature manipulations, adversarial cost, and
attack goals, and accordingly present a general attack strategy for further
investigations [32, 33, 29] (See Section 4.2 for details).
– Propose secure-learning paradigms against adversarial attacks: Resting on
the learning-based classifier which is degraded by the adversarial malware at-
tacks, we propose three secure-learning models SecDefender, SecureDroid, and
DroidEye to counter these attacks. In our proposed methods, SecDefender
adopts classifier retraining technique on basis of our proposed adversarial at-
tack model AdvAttack and enhances the robustness of the classifier using the
security regularization terms; SecureDroid utilizes a novel feature selection
method to build more secure classifier by enforcing attackers to increase the
adversarial costs and maximize the manipulations, and introduces an ensem-
ble learning approach to aggregate different individual classifiers constructed
using our proposed feature selection method to improve system security while
not compromising detection accuracy; DroidEye takes advantage of gradient
masking for feature space, utilizes count featurization to transform the binary
feature space into continuous probabilities encoding the distribution in each
class (either benign or malicious) to reduce the adversarial gradient of the
learning model, and then introduces softmax function (i.e., normalized expo-
nential function) with adversarial parameter to find the best trade-off between
security and accuracy for the classifier by tuning the adversarial parameter
[32, 33, 28, 30] (See Section 4.3 for details).
• We develop practical systems integrating our proposed methods for comprehen-
sive experimental studies on real sample collections from an anti-malware industry
company. Specifically, we collect different sample sets from Comodo Cloud Secu-
rity Center; based on these real sample collections, we construct practical systems
based on our proposed methods and provide a series of comprehensive experiments
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to empirically evaluate the performances of these methods [33, 28, 32, 31, 27, 30]
(See Section 3.2.3, 3.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.4.4, and 4.5.3 for details).
In sum, by the date of this dissertation, we have had 9 publications [31, 27, 66, 143, 32,
33, 28, 29, 30] in intelligent malware detection using file-to-file relations and adversarial
machine learning in malware detection, including the prestigious IEEE EISIC’2017 Best
Paper Award.
1.4 Organization of This Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 first discusses the devel-
opment of malware including its definition in Section 2.1.1, taxonomy in Section 2.1.2,
and its history in Section 2.1.3; then specifies the development of malware detection
techniques in Section 2.2. Chapter 3 describes file-to-file relation investigation and
graph construction in Section 3.1, designs an enhanced Belief Propagation algorithm
for unknown file labeling in Section 3.2, builds effective active learning framework for
malware detection in Section 3.3, and leverages Long Short-term Memory for graph rep-
resentation learning in Section 3.4. Chapter 4 presents the adversarial attacks under
different scenarios in Section 4.2, and secure-learning paradigms SecDefender in Sec-
tion 4.3, SecureDroid Section 4.4, and DroidEye in Section 4.5. Chapter 5 summarizes
this dissertation in Section 5.1 and addresses the future work in Section 5.2.
8Chapter 2
Development of Malware and
Malware Detection Techniques
2.1 Development of Malware
2.1.1 Definition of Malware
Malware, short for mal icious software , generally refers to software programs that are
designed to deliberately fulfill different harmful intents of an attacker [12, 51, 36], such as
disturbing system operations, encrypting, stealing or deleting sensitive data, hijacking or
altering core computing functions and monitoring computer activities of users without
their permission, or even bringing down servers and critical infrastructures [106, 65].
Besides that, some other definitions have been also offered to describe malware [70]:
Grimes defined malicious code as “any software program designed to move from computer
to computer and network to network in order to intentionally modify computer systems
without the consent of the owner or operator, that includes viruses, Trojan horses, worms,
script attacks, and rogue Internet code” [56]; Vasudevan et al. described malware as a
generic term that encompasses viruses, trojans, spywares and other intrusive code [123];
Thomas et al. also described malware as a general term used by computer professionals
to mean a variety of forms of hostile, intrusive, or annoying software or program code
[122]; while Saracino et al. considered that malware hides treacherous code performing
actions in the background that threatens the user privacy, the device integrity, or even
user’s credit [113]. In a nutshell, the typical characteristics of malware can be depicted
as destructive, unauthorized, stealthy, and transmissible, and they may infiltrate the
systems through the vulnerable services over the network, the downloading process from
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the Internet, or being tricked by the attackers into deliberately executing malicious codes
on their machines [144, 46, 107].
Driven by economic benefits, malware industry has invented automated malware
development toolkits (e.g., Zeus, Kronos, MPack, exploit kit) to produce and mutate
hundreds of thousands of malicious codes per day using techniques, such as instruction
virtualization, packing, polymorphism, emulation, and metamorphism [119]; these mal-
ware development toolkits also lead to a massive proliferation of new malware samples
due to their wide availability [144]. As a result, malware has been rapidly gaining preva-
lence, spread and infected computing devices at an unprecedented rate around the world.
According to AV-TEST Institute’s statistics [4], as shown in Figure 2.1, over 350,000 new
malicious programs and potentially unwanted applications are currently registered ev-
eryday, while more than 800 million malware have been created in the last ten years.
This has posed serious and evolving security threats to Internet users.
Figure 2.1: (a) New malware created in the last two years, and (b) total malware created
in the last ten years [4].
2.1.2 Taxonomy of Malware
Malware comes in wide range of variations like virus, worm, backdoor, Trojan-horse,
spyware, rootkit, adware, bot, scareware, ransomware [51], which are varying in different
purposes and proliferation ways and containing unique characteristics and traits. We
would like to provide a brief overview of these most common and prevalent types of
malware as follows [144, 106, 70].
• Virus: A virus (e.g., Creeper, Elk Cloner) is a piece of code that replicates by
inserting itself into other software programs, files, or the boot sector of the hard
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drive. A program that a virus has inserted itself into is infected, and is referred
to as the virus’s host. Viruses cannot run independently since they need to be
activated by their host programs.
• Worm: A worm (e.g., Love Gate, SQL Slammer) is a program that can run inde-
pendently without a host program and propagate a fully working version of itself to
other machines. Worms usually spread without any human interaction or directives
from the malware authors.
• Backdoor: A backdoor (e.g., Sobig, Mydoom) is a malicious program that bypasses
authentication procedures to access and thus compromise a system via a network.
Additionally the use of a rootkit or code obfuscation makes the backdoors very
difficult to locate.
• Trojan horse: A Trojan horse (e.g., Zeus, ZeroAccess) is a software program de-
signed to appear as a legitimate program, thereby tricking a user into installing it
onto their computing devices; when embedded by its designer in an application or
system, the Trojan horses will perform malicious and unauthorized actions in the
backend. Generally Trojans are responsible for the theft or destruction of data.
• Spyware: Spyware (e.g., keyloggers, web beacons) refers to a type of malware that
has been designed to gather data and information about users and also observe
their activity without users’ knowledge and consent.
• Rootkit: A rootkit (e.g., Knark, Adore) is a form of malware that obtains
administrator-level access to the victim’s system. After the installation process, the
program provides threat actors root or privileged access to the system. Rootkits
can be used in user-mode or tamper with operating system structures as a device
driver or a kernel module.
• Adware: Adware, or malvertising (e.g., Fireball, BaiduBarz), not only presents
unwanted advertisements to the users to generate revenue, but also use authorized
online advertising to spread malicious software.
• Bot: A bot (e.g., Agobot, Sdbot) is a piece of malware that allows the bot master
to remotely control the infected system. Bots typically spread through exploiting
software vulnerabilities or employing social engineering techniques to allure unsus-
pecting users to execute malware binaries. Once a system has been infected, the
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bot master can transform these individual victimized systems into a vast network,
called a botnet.
• Scareware: Scareware is a form of malware that utilizes social engineering to lure a
user into buying and downloading unwanted software, such as fake antivirus soft-
ware, which has posed severe financial and privacy-related threats to the victims.
• Ransomware: Ransomware is one of the most popular malware in recent years,
which installs stealthily on a victim’s computer and executes a cryptovirology at-
tack that prevents users from accessing their system or personal files, and demands
ransom payment from the victim in order to regain access.
• Cryptocurrency mining malware: Cryptocurrency mining malware (e.g., Coinhive),
also simply called cryptojacking, refers to software programs and malware compo-
nents developed to take over a computing device’s resources and use them for
cryptocurrency mining without a user’s explicit permission [118].
• Hybrid malware: Hybrid malware combines two or more other forms of malware
into a new type to achieve more powerful attack functionalities.
2.1.3 History of Malware
The history of malware starts back in 1949 when John von Neumann began work-
ing on self-reproducing automatons through “Theory and Organization of Complicated
Automata” [125]; it seems no one attempted to implement these automatons to cause
damage to the system. The root of malware came into life around 1970 named “Creeper”,
an experimental self-replicating program written by Bob Thomas that gained access via
the ARPANET and copied itself to the remote system where the message “I’m the
creeper, catch me if you can!” was displayed [34]. The term “Virus” was first coined by
Fred Cohen in 1985 [88]. After that, a massive and outrageous malware industry was
born [105]. Kingsoft reported that the average number of infected computers per day
was between 2-5 million [76]; while cybercrime will cost the world $6 trillion annually by
2021, up from $3 trillion in 2015 [37]. In this section, we would like to take a brief look
at the development of malware and get to know how it evolved and impacted the world
as follows [105, 144, 52, 129].
• 1970–1979: Creeper, most commonly recognized as the first computer virus, was
created by Bob Thomas in 1971 as an experimental self-replicating program that
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corrupted DEC PDP-10 computers running the TENEX operating system; the
Wabbit (or rabbit) virus was created in 1974 that blocks up the system of a com-
puter through multiple self-replicating; PERVADE virus appeared in 1975 that
adheres to other programs and allows them to spread its copies; the term “Worm”
was also introduced by John Brunner in 1975.
• 1980–1989: Elk Cloner virus, found in Apple II systems, was written by high
school student Richard Skrenta in 1981 that resulted in one of the earliest large-
scale virus outbreak to affect personal computers; Brain virus was released in 1986
that is considered as the first virus to infect MS-DOS computers and the first IBM
PC compatible virus, while in the same year PC-Writer Trojan was created as one
of the earliest Trojans; Vienna virus appeared in 1987 that was regarded as the first
virus to infect both COM files and EXE files; Christmas Tree virus was created
in the same year that was the first widely disruptive replicating network virus;
Morris Worm was released in 1988 to infect a substantial percentage of computers
connected to ARPANET while its author (i.e., Robert Morris) became the first
malware author convicted for his crimes; AIDS Trojan was spread in 1989 that
encrypts all filenames on the system and asks for payment, which is considered as
the first known ransomware.
• 1990–1999: Chameleon viruses were developed by Mark Washburn in 1990 as the
first family of polymorphic viruses; the first Macro virus, called Concept, was
created in 1995 used to infect Microsoft Word documents; in 1996, the first virus
designed specifically for Windows 95 files - Boza, the first Excel macro virus -
Laroux, and the first Linux virus - Staog were released; in 1999, Melissa virus
was the first mass-emailing virus that utilizes Outlook address books from infected
machines, and sends the copy of itself to 50 people at a time, while ExploreZip
worm was detected to destroy Microsoft Office documents.
• 2000–2009: Starting from 2000, Internet and email worms were prevailing across
the globe, and malware toolkits drove malware to grow significantly in its number
and dissemination. In 2000, the ILOVEYOU worm, one of the most damaging
worms ever, was created by a computer science student that infected millions of
computers worldwide and costed more than $5.5 billion in damages; In 2001, differ-
ent worms were detected that targeted Microsoft systems, such as Sadmind, Sircam,
Code Red, Nimda, and Klez; SQL Slammer Worm, one of the fastest spreading
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worms of all time, was created in 2003 that caused massive Internet access disrup-
tions worldwide; Cabir Virus was released in 2004, which was widely acknowledged
as the first mobile phone virus; In the same year, the first internet worm - Witty,
and the first known webworm Santy were also launched; the first-ever malware
for Mac OS X, a trojan-horse known as OSX/Leap-A or OSX/Oompa-A was an-
nounced in 2006; computer worm Conficker was found in 2008 causing some of the
worst damage seen since SQL Slammer.
• 2010–present: Since 2010, the sophistication of malware has been significantly
evolving, that results in advanced malware with different evasion tactics. Stuxnet,
a malicious computer worm, was detected in 2000, which was the first worm to
attack SCADA systems and one of the most resource-intensive bits of malware
created to date; Zeus Trojan, or Zbot released in 2011 was one of the most successful
pieces of botnet software in the world, impacting millions of machines; Cryptolocker
discovered in 2013 was one of many early ransomware programs; Cerber detected
in 2016 was one of the heavy-hitters in the ransomware sphere, and one of the most
prolific crypto-malware threats; WannaCry Ransomware and its variants have been
spreading globally since 2017 by encrypting data and demanding ransom payments,
which is one of the most prevalent and diabolical malware in recent years.
2.2 Development of Malware Detection Techniques
In order to combat the evolving malware attacks and protect legitimate users from
these threats, the major defense is the software products from anti-malware compa-
nies. With more and more sophisticated malware samples emerging in the wild, both
anti-malware industry and researchers have developed various countermeasures for mal-
ware detection. In the following sections, we briefly introduce the progress of intelligent
malware detection.
2.2.1 Signature-based Malware Detection
Signature-based methods are widely used in anti-malware software products from
different companies to provide the major defense against malware, such as Comodo,
Kaspersky, Kingsoft, and Symantec [49, 48]. A signature is a short sequence of bytes,
which is often unique to each known malware, allowing newly encountered files to be
correctly identified with a small error rate [74, 92]. In addition to anti-malware software
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products, some early research efforts have also been conducted on signature-based mal-
ware detection. Sun et al. [119] developed a signature based malware detection system
called SAVE (Static Analyzer of Vicious Executables) which extracted the signatures
from the original malware with the hypothesis that all versions of the same malware
share a common core signature; Venugopal et al. [124] detailed a signature matching
algorithm to scan malware in mobile devices. This method is traditionally known as
time and labor consuming and less responsive to new threats as that signatures are often
manually generated, updated, and disseminated by domain experts [144]. As introduced
above, the malware industry has invented automated malware development toolkits to
create and mutate hundreds of thousands of malicious codes per day which can easily
slip through such traditional signature-based malware detection [149, 144, 61].
2.2.2 Heuristic-based Malware Detection
To address the aforementioned challenges, heuristic-based methods were proposed
as complements to signature-based methods for malware detection [20]. As opposed to
signature-based malware detection, which looks to match signatures found in files with
that of a database of known malware, heuristic-based detection uses rules and/or pat-
terns determined by experts to look for behaviors which may indicate malicious intent
and thus discriminate malware samples and benign files [144]. These rules and patterns
should be generic enough to be consistent with variants of the same malware threat,
but not falsely matched on benign files [45]. Some classic heuristic-based detection
techniques include [85, 24, 109]: neural networks(NNs) being adopted for their adapt-
ability to environmental changes and their ability of prediction [89, 24]; fuzzy logic using
approximation for logic rather than precise classical logic [91, 109]; genetic algorithm
applying principles of evolutionary biology such as inheritance, mutation, selection and
combination for deriving classification rules and selecting appropriate features or opti-
mal parameters for malware detection [17, 91]. Heuristic-based malware detection is an
effective way to identify unknown threats for the most up-to-date real-time protection,
but there are downsides: (1) the analysis of malware samples and the construction of
rules/patterns by domain experts is often error-prone, which results in high false pos-
itives; (2) this sort of scanning and analysis is time-consuming, which may slow-down
system performance [144]. Considering that the speed of malware creation is faster than
rules/pattern construction, the unknown files make the clients become more and more
overloaded.
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2.2.3 Machine Learning-based Malware Detection
To overcome the problem of the clients being heavy and keep the malware detection
effective and efficient, cloud-based detection [149] has been recently used by most of
the anti-malware vendors, the scheme of which can be summarized as “blocking invalid
software programs from a blacklist and authenticating valid software programs from a
white list at the client (user) side, and predicting any unknown files (i.e., the gray list) at
the cloud (server) side and quickly producing the verdict results to the clients” [149, 144].
More specifically, the signature sets on the clients are first exploited to scan the newly
received files; those files that cannot be recognized by existing signatures will be labeled
as unknown files and their information will be collected and sent to the cloud server; the
learning models constructed on the cloud side will classify the unknown files as malware
or benign files, and send back the classification results to the client side immediately.
Cloud-based detection enables an up-to-date security solution for malware detection
[144]. However, the unknown files in the gray list is constantly increasing. According
to the AV-TEST Institute’s report, over 350,000 new malware are released everyday [4].
This calls for intelligent techniques to support efficient and effective malware detection
on the cloud side.
Since the quantity, diversity and sophistication of malware have significantly in-
creased in recent years, in order to effectively and efficiently detect malware from the
real and large daily sample collection, new, intelligent malware detection systems have
been developed by applying machine learning techniques [140, 7, 90, 139, 142, 95, 60, 39,
67, 68, 151, 131, 132, 137, 69]. In these methods, malware detection is a two-step pro-
cess: feature extraction and classification/clustering. The performance of such malware
detection methods critically depend on the extracted features and the categorization
techniques. We provide a comprehensive investigation on machine learning-based mal-
ware detection techniques as follows.
• Classification: Na¨ıve Bayes on the extracted strings and byte sequences was applied
in [114, 50], which claimed that Na¨ıve Bayes classifier performed better than tradi-
tional signature-based method. Kolter et al. [79] focused on static analysis of the
executable files and compared Na¨ıve Bayes, Support Vector Machine and Decision
Tree based on the n-grams. Wang et al. [128] extracted registries and activity net-
work from spyware and applied Support Vector Machine for surveillance spyware
detection. Santos et al. first used n-grams, strings, and OpCode to build Deci-
sion Tree and used dynamically extracted behaviors to formulate kNN for malware
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detection [111], and then they further proposed semi-supervised algorithms (i.e.,
collective classification models) on various features for unknown malware detection
[112]. Ye et al. [139, 146, 148] proposed IMDS, Hierarchical associative classifier
(HAC), and CIMDS performing associative classification on Windows API calls
extracted from executable files. Shah et al. [116] applied various feature selection
algorithms to obtain the feature sets from PE files and used Artificial Neural Net-
works to detect new and unknown malware. Kong et al. [80] extracted the function
call graph from each program, collected various types of fine-grained features at
the function level, and then applied an ensemble of weighted classifiers for malware
detection. Cesare et al. [23] explored string similarity metrics for malware detec-
tion based on k-subgraphs and q-grams of structured control flow graphs, while
Anderson et al. [2] used similarity metrics on instruction traces to differentiate
malware and benign files.
• Clustering: Hou et al. [65] developed the intelligent malware detection system
using cluster-oriented ensemble classifiers resting on the analysis of Windows API
calls. Most of these existing researches are built on shallow learning architectures,
which only made use of the files with class labels (either malicious or benign) during
the training phase, while ignoring the important information from the large num-
ber of unlabeled file samples, which leave a large room for improvement. Bailey et
al. [8] proposed a hierarchical clustering technique that describes malware behav-
ior in terms of system state changes and automatically categorized these profiles
of malware into groups that reflect similar classes of behaviors and demonstrated
how behavior-based clustering provides a more direct and effective way of classi-
fying and analyzing Internet malware. Ye et al. [145] presented an Automatic
Malware Categorization System (AMCS) on function-based instruction sequences
and instruction frequency that groups malware samples into families sharing some
common characteristics using a cluster ensemble by aggregating the clustering so-
lutions generated by different base clustering algorithms.
• Deep learning: Due to its superior ability in feature learning through multilayer
deep architecture [62], deep learning is feasible to learn higher level concepts
based on the local feature representations [98]. As a result, researchers have paid
much attention to deep learning methods in the domains of malware detection
[60, 84, 98, 71, 142]. Ouellette et al. [98] extracted control flow graphs to present
malware samples, and used a deep probabilistic model (sum-product network) to
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compare the similarities between the unknown file samples and those of represen-
tative sample features from known classes of malware. Jung et al. [71] used the
features of header, tags, bytecode and API calls and utilized an ensemble learner
consisting of different deep learning networks (e.g., deep feed-forward neural net-
work, deep recurrent neural network) to classify the Adobe Flash file samples. Li
et al. [84] proposed a hybrid malicious code detection approach on the basis of Au-
toEncoder and Deep Belief Network, where AutoEncoder was used to reduce the
dimensionality of data, and a Deep Belief Network was applied to detect malicious
code. Hardy et al. [60] and Ye et al. [142] both exploited API calls as inputs;
the difference is that Hardy et al. developed Stacked AutoEncoders (SAEs) while
Ye et al. formulated a heterogeneous deep learning framework composed of an
AutoEncoder stacked up with multilayer restricted Boltzmann machines (RBMs)
for malware detection.
• File relations: Besides those features stated above (e.g., strings and byte sequences,
n-grams, API calls, function call graph, control flow graphs, etc.) extracted from
file contents, file-to-machine relation graphs [25] and file-to-file relation graphs
[149, 121] were also used as the features for malware detection. Chau et al. [25]
and Tamersoy et al. [121] explored standard Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm
to implement semi-supervised learning for malware detection. Ye et al. [149]
proposed a semi-parametric classification model for combining file content and file
relations together for malware detection. Karampatziakis et al. [72] built regression
classifiers based on graphs induced by file relationships for malware detection. They
showed that the system’s detection accuracy could be significantly improved using
the proposed method. File relation graphs have been starting to be leveraged
to solve malware detection problems, but all these existing works merely take
advantage of the graph structure while not going further to analyze the critical
information about their properties and characteristics of the relationships among
different file samples.
2.2.4 Adversarial Machine Learning in Malware Detection
Machine learning techniques offer unparalleled flexibility in automatic malware detec-
tion. However, machine learning itself can be a target of attack by a malicious adversary
[87, 126, 14, 13, 127, 40, 11, 15]. In some cybersecurity domains, there are ample ev-
idences that show adversaries can actively manipulate the data to evade the detection
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[38, 152, 87, 18, 14]. For example, in the domain of spam email detection, Dalvi et al.
[38] examined the cost for measuring each feature of the dataset using Na¨ıve Bayes clas-
sifier, and proposed an optimal strategy for the adversary to play against the classifier.
Zhang et al. [152] took gradient steps to find the closest evasion point x′ to the mali-
cious sample x. The Adversarial Classifier Reverse Engineering (ACRE) framework [87]
was introduced to study how an adversary can learn sufficient information to construct
adversarial attacks using minimal adversarial cost. Bru¨ckner et al. [18] presented the
interaction between the learner and the data generator as a static game, and explored
the adversarial conditions and properties to find the equilibrial prediction model in the
context of spam email filtering. All these adversarial attacks prompt increasing research
efforts to improve the security of machine learning.
Specifically, the defense methods can be generally divided into four categories: Stack-
elberg game theories [19, 58, 18, 127], feature operations [152, 82, 53], retraining frame-
works [54, 133, 83], and ensemble classifier systems [16, 40, 78]. To apply Stackelberg
game theories, Bruckner et al. [18] first presented the interaction between the learner
and the adversary as a static game, and explored the adversarial properties to find the
equilibrium prediction model; they then further simulated the interaction as a Stackel-
berg competition, and derived an optimization problem to determine the solution of this
game [19]. Wang et al. [127] modeled the adversary action as it controlling a vector
α to modify the training data set X, and transformed the classifier into a convex op-
timization problem. More recently, feature operation methods have also been proposed
to counter some kinds of adversarial data manipulations, such as feature deletion [53],
feature clustering [82], feature reduction [152], etc. In addition, retraining frameworks
are becoming more and more widely applied to boost the resilience of learning algorithms
through: (1) adding adversarial samples to the training data that evade the previously
computed classifier [83, 54], and (2) manipulating the training data distribution that
its distribution is matched to the test data [133]. To improve the security of machine
learning under generic settings, some research efforts have been devoted to multiple clas-
sifier systems. Kolcz et al. [78] applied averaging method resting on random subsets
of reweighted features to produce a linear ensemble classifier. Biggio et al. [16] built a
multiple-classifier system to improve the robustness of the classifier through bagging, and
the random subspace method. Debarr et al. [40] explored randomization to generalize
learning model by randomly choosing dataset or features, and estimated parameters that
fit the data best. In these ensemble learning systems, randomization is the main method
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for feature selection. Though these theories and approaches are promising, the appli-
cation of adversarial machine learning into malware detection domain has been scarce
with the exception that Sˇrndic et al. [126], Xu et al. [135], and Demontis et al. [41] all
exploited PDF malware or Android malware as a case study to evaluate the security of
learning-based classifiers (e.g., PDFrate, Hidost, and Drebin). With the popularity of
machine learning based detections, such adversaries will become even more violent.
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Chapter 3
Intelligent Malware Detection
Utilizing File-to-file Relations
File-to-file relations, such as file-co-existence, can provide invaluable information in
malware detection and make evasion harder [149, 25, 121, 72]. To better understand
the properties of file-to-file relations (i.e., malware-malware, malware-benign, benign-
benign relations), we’d like to take a further step to delve deeper into the relationship
characteristics of malware and benign files. It is of interest to know:
• How can we construct the file-to-file relation graph between malware and benign
files?
• What graph-based features, relationship characteristics, and representations can be
employed for malware detection?
• Instead of traditional machine learning-based classification methods, how can we
build effective learning frameworks over graph for malware detection?
More specifically, we analyze and utilize the relations among file samples to construct file
relation graph. Resting on the constructed file-to-file relation graph, we first present our
enhanced Belief Propagation (EBP) algorithm for malware detection; then, we design
several new and robust graph-based features to represent each file and further investigate
the relationship characteristics of relation graph, on the basis of which, we propose an
active learning framework that applies Malicious Score Inference Algorithm (MSIA) to
select the representative samples from the large unknown file collection for labeling and
then uses EBP algorithm to detect malware; afterwards, we learn representations for files
over graph using Long Short-term Memory (LSTM), which will be fed to SVM to train
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the classification model and predict if the unlabeled files are malicious or not. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work of investigating the relationship characteristics
of the file-to-file relations in malware detection using social network analysis.
3.1 File-to-file Relation Graph Construction
In this section, we (1) first introduce the file relation graph construction, and (2)
then provide deep analysis of malware’s social relation network.
File Relation Graph Construction. Based on the collected data, we construct a
file-to-file relation graph to describe the relations among file samples. Generally, two
files are related if they are shared by many clients (or equivalently, file lists). The file
relation graph is defined as G = (V,E), where V is the set of file samples and E denotes
the relations between file samples, which is shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: An example of file-to-file relation graph.
Given two file samples vi and vj , let Ci be the set of clients containing vi and Cj be
the set of clients containing vj . |.| represents the size of a set. The connectivity between
vi and vj is computed as
con(vi, vj) =
|Ci
⋂
Cj |
|Ci
⋃
Cj | . (3.1)
If the connectivity between a pair of file samples is greater than the specified threshold
(e.g., 0.5), then there is an edge between them. Each file is in a state S ∈ {sm, sb, su}
(sm: malicious, sb: benign, su: unknown). Assume that vi is in state si and vj is with
state sj , the weight of the edge between vi and vj which infers the probability that node
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i and node j can be connected together is defined as
w(vi, vj) =
∣∣Esi,sj ∣∣
|E| , (3.2)
where
∣∣Esi,sj ∣∣ is the number of the edges between all the files with states si and sj , and
|E| is the number of all the edges. The weight of node vi which denotes its popularity
can be defined as
w(vi) =
|Ci|
|C| , (3.3)
where C is the set of all the clients.
To visualize the file-to-file relation graph, we analyze the dataset obtained from
Comodo Cloud Security Center, which contains the relationships between 60, 724 files
(9,893 malware, 19,402 benign files and 31,429 unknown files) on 7, 093 clients. For the
file relations collected from 7, 093 clients, we construct the graph consisting of 60, 724
nodes and 3, 471, 288 edges. Figure 3.2(a) shows a part of the constructed graph, while
Figure 3.2(b) and (c) give examples of a malware relation graph and a benign file relation
graph with one-hop information respectively.
(a) File-to-file Relation Graph (b) Malware Relation Graph (c) Benign File Relation Graph
Figure 3.2: Visualization of file-to-file relation graphs: (a) a part of the constructed
graph; (b) an example of a malware relation graph with one-hop information; (c) an
example of a benign file relation graph with one-hop information (Red nodes denote
malware, green nodes represent benign file, and yellow nodes are unknown file) [27].
Graph Property Overview. To gain an overview about the property of file relation
graph, we used a subset of our data collection includes the file lists from 1000 clients
which describe file co-existence relations between 1,540 malware, 7,687 benign files, and
2,250 unknown files. Figure 3.3 shows a zoom-in view of a part of the constructed file
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relation graph. From Figure 3.3, we can see that many of the red nodes are associated
with other red nodes and form some clusters, while the green nodes are also related to
other green nodes and form their clusters. The nodes within the same cluster have strong
relations with each other: (1) the red clusters may be the variants of malware families
(e.g., family of online-game trojans); (2) the green clusters may be the related files of
same applications (e.g., Acrobat installation archive and its related files).
Figure 3.3: A zoom-in view of a part of the constructed file relation graph [66].
Based on the dataset described above, we also use fourteen measures in Table 3.1
to see the differences between benign file relation graph, ordinary malware (i.e., 1,220
malware whose the existence frequency is < 100) file relation graph and popular mal-
ware (i.e., 320 malware whose existence frequency is ≥ 100) file relation graph. In
Table 3.1, from the comparisons of G1 and G2, we can see that the measures of compo-
nents, component ratio, connectedness and fragmentation are different between benign
file relation graph and ordinary malware file relation graph; while from the comparisons
of G2 and G3, we can see that the measures of avg degree, centralization and density
are different between ordinary malware file relation graph and top popular malware file
relation graph. The different properties between benign file relation graph and malware
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file relation graph enable us to discriminate malware and benign files, while the differ-
ent properties between ordinary malware file relation graph and popular malware file
relation graph may allow us to predict the trend of malware prevalence.
Table 3.1: Graph property comparisons
NO. Measures G1 G2 G3
1 H-Index 129 125 125
2 Avg Degree 49.842 40.677 12.098
3 Centralization 0.340 0.344 0.081
4 Density 0.018 0.014 0.001
5 Components 103 11 2
6 Component Ratio 0.036 0.004 0.000
7 Connectedness 0.964 0.996 1.000
8 Fragmentation 0.036 0.004 0.000
9 Closure 0.081 0.091 0.047
10 Avg Distance 2.744 3.056 3.408
11 SD Distance 0.631 0.836 0.717
12 Diameter 5 7 4
13 Breadth 0.625 0.645 0.689
14 Compactness 0.375 0.355 0.311
“G1”: graph constructed based on 7,687 benign files and files co-exist
with them, “G2”: graph constructed based on 1,220 ordinary malware
and files co-exist with them, “G3”: graph constructed based on 320
popular malware and files co-exist with them.
3.2 An Enhanced Belief Propagation Algorithm for Mal-
ware Detection
In this section, we first introduce the preliminaries of BP, and analyze the reason
why the standard BP fails for our application, then propose an enhanced BP for malware
detection based on our constructed file relation graphs: we fine tune various components
used in the algorithm and well design the message update and belief read-out functions
for malware detection.
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3.2.1 Standard Belief Propagation
Belief Propagation (BP) is a promising method for solving inference problems over
graphs and it has also been successfully used in many domains (e.g., computer vision,
coding theory) [150]. It was first proposed by Judea Pearl [102] to calculate marginal
distribution in Markov Random Fields and Bayes Nets. Nodes of the graph perform as a
local summation operation by iterations using the prior knowledge from their neighbors
and then pass the information to all the neighbors in the form of messages [97]. By
definition, the message is the neighbor node’s opinion for the current node’s probability
of being in the designated status. The passing operation should cover every pair of
connected nodes.
The key idea of BP is to update each node’s message until the sum of messages
converge or the iterations reach the designated number. Once the final messages are
defined, the belief value of each node will be read out from all its neighbor nodes. The
belief is the final result employed for inference. Figure 3.4 illustrates the message update
of node j from its neighbor node i considering all the messages flowing into node i (except
message from node j).
Figure 3.4: Message update from node i to node j
Mathematically, the message update equation in standard BP is
mi→j(vj) =
∑
vi∈S
fi→j(vi, vj)gi(vi)
∏
k∈N(i)/j
mk→i(vi) (3.4)
where mi→j(vj) is the message sent from node i to node j, node i’s belief that node j
is in the state vj ; both gi(vi) and fi→j(vi, vj) are typically called as energy functions, in
which, gi(vi) is the node potential, meaning the prior probability of node i being in the
state vi, while fi→j(vi, vj) is the edge potential, referring the probability of node i being
in the state vi and node j being in the state vj ; S is the set of states; N(i)/j is the set
of nodes neighboring node i (not including node j). BP algorithm stops when message
updates converge or a maximum number of iterations has finished. Then we calculate
Chapter 3. Intelligent Malware Detection Utilizing File-to-file Relations 26
the belief value of each node as follow
bi(vi) = gi(vi)
∏
k∈N(i)
mk→i(vi) (3.5)
In general, we always normalize both message mi→j(vi) and belief bi(vi), preventing val-
ues from underflow or overflow. The standard BP is commonly called sum-product (from
its message-update equation). A simple variant, called max-sum, is used to estimate the
state configuration with maximum probability.
3.2.2 Enhanced Belief Propagation
To tailor BP algorithm to our problem, the energy function designs as well as message
update and belief read-out are the key points. Unfortunately, the energy function designs
based on the standard BP in AESOP [121] fail in our application. To put this into
perspective, we use the example in Figure 3.5 for further illustration, in which “M”
denotes malware, “B” denotes benign file, and “G” is unknown file. Figure 3.5(b) is the
constructed file relation graph based on the sample dataset (note that the weights of the
nodes and edges are different).
(a) A sample datase (b) file relation graph
Figure 3.5: A sample dataset and its file relation graph constructed
Table 3.2: The edge potential design in AESOP[121]
fi→j(xi, xj) xi: Malicious xj : Benign
xi: Malicious 0.99 0.01
xj : Benign 0.01 0.99
We employ the same energy functions designed in AESOP [121]: (1) the prior prob-
ability is 0.99 when the file is benign, 0.01 when the file is malicious, and 0.5 when the
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file is unknown; (2) the edge potential design is shown in Table 3.2. When the mes-
sage updates converge (within threshold 10−3), the belief values of the data nodes (i.e.,
BP Belief) are shown in Table 3.3. From the results (i.e., BP Class) in Table 3.3, we
can see that file B3 and file G6 are misclassified.
Table 3.3: The results of standard BP and EBP based on Figure 3.5
Nodes BP Belief BP Class EBP Belief EBP Class
M1 0.000000 M 0.022937 M
M2 0.260410 M 0.046170 M
B3 0.000000 M 0.135394 B
B4 0.645915 B 0.381034 B
B5 0.489330 B 0.317528 B
G6 0.169901 M 0.157791 B
In order to solve the problem above and make BP tailor to our application, we fine
tune various components in BP and carefully design the message update and belief read-
out functions. Before doing that, we first analyze the meaning of each energy function
in our case for malware detection. In Equation 3.4, mi→j(vj), fi→j(vi, vj), and gi(vi)
represent message from node i to node j, edge potential, and node potential respectively.
For malware detection problem, accordingly, mi→j(vj) means the probability of node i
believes that the neighbor node j being a benign file; fi→j(vi, vj) is the probability that
node i and node j can be connected together; and gi(vi) is the prior probability of node
i being a benign file.
As described in Equation 3.2, the weight of edge between a pair of nodes is the
probability of node i being in the state vi and node j being in the state vj , which is the
edge potential fi→j(vi, vj) in BP. Therefore, we use the weight of edge w(vi, vj) (defined
in Equation 3.2) between node i and j as the edge potential in our malware detection
application, which is further illustrated in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: The edge potential design in enhanced BP
fi→j(xi, xj) xi: Malicious xj : Benign
xi: Malicious |Esm,sm | / |E| |Esm,sb | / |E|
xj : Benign |Esb,sm | / |E| |Esb,sb | / |E|
For node potential, gi(vi) is the prior probability of node i being a benign file. We
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consider both its state and weight. Equation 3.6 shows our design of node potential in
malware detection problem.
gi(vi) =

0.5 + 0.5 ∗ w(vi) if state(vi) = sb
0.5 if state(xi) = sg
0.5− 0.5 ∗ w(vi) if state(vi) = sm,
(3.6)
where w(xi) is the weight of node i which can be calculated by Equation 3.3.
Instead of using sum-product, we redesign the message update equation as below:
mi→j(vj) =
1
β
∑
vi∈S
fi→j(vi, vj)gi(vi)
∑
k∈N(i)/jmk→i(vi)
p
, (3.7)
where p equals to the number of the neighbors of node i (excluded node j) and β is a
normalizing constant. In our application, we also initialize all the messages to 1. The
belief read-out equation is designed as follow
bi(vi) =
1
γ
gi(vi)
∑
k∈N(i)mk→i(vi)
p
, (3.8)
where γ is an adjustable constant.
Based on our enhanced BP (EBP) with the new energy functions as well as fine tuned
message update and belief read-out equations above, using the same sample dataset in
Figure 3.5, the belief value of each node (i.e., EBP Belief) is shown in Table 3.3. From
the results (i.e., EBP Class) in Table 3.3, we can see that file B3 and file G6 are correctly
identified as benign files; our adjusted BP algorithm performs well in malware detection
problem. The implementation of EBP is given in Algorithm 1.
3.2.3 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we conduct three sets of experiments to empirically evaluate our
proposed EBP: (1) In the first set of experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of our
proposed EBP based on the file relation graphs for malware detection by comparing
it with BP with sum-product, max-sum and AESOP in [121]. (2) In the second set
of experiments, we evaluate our proposed algorithm compared with SVM and Decision
Tree. (3) In the last set of experiments, we evaluate our proposed EBP algorithm in real
industry application for malware detection.
Experimental Setup
We measure the malware detection performance of different methods using the eval-
uation measures shown in Table 3.5. All the experiments are conducted under the
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Algorithm 1: EBP - An enhanced Belief Propagation algorithm based
on file relation graphs for malware detection
Input: G = (V,E): undirected weighted file relation graph(s), w(xi, xj):
the edge weights for file pairs xi and xj , w(vi): the node weights
for files vi
Output: class label of each file
Initialize (file states, messages): 0.99 when the file is benign, 0.01 when the
file is malicious, and 0.5 when the file is unknown;
Calculate node potential gi(vi) for each file vi;
Calculate edge potential fi→j(xi, xj) for each pair of associated files xi and
xj ;
while messages haven’t converged or iteration hasn’t reached do
for each file in graph(s) do
Message Update: mnew ← mold;
end
Normalization;
end
Calculate belief value of each file using its neighbors’ messages;
Define the threshold using the training data set;
Infer the status of each file according to the probability: benign when the
probability is greater than the threshold; otherwise, malware
environment of 64 Bit Windows 7 operating system with 4th Generation Intel Core i7
Processor (Quad Core, 8MB Cache, up to 4.0GHz w/ Turbo Boost) plus 16G of RAM
using Apache Pig, MySQL and C++.
Comparisons of Different Belief Propagation Algorithms
In this section, we conduct the experiments to evaluate our proposed EBP for mal-
ware detection based on the first dataset containing 4,675 files: 260 are malware, 2,583
are benign files and 1,832 are unknown (with the analysis by human experts, 1,627 of
them are marked as benign and 14 are malicious). We also compare our proposed algo-
rithm with standard BP in sum-product, max-sum, and AESOP in [121]. The results
in Figure 3.6 show that our proposed EBP algorithm obtains the highest TPR and the
lowest FPR that result in the best F1 measure and ACC, performing better than other
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Table 3.5: The evaluation measures of malware detection performance
Measures Specification
TP Number of files correctly classified as malicious
TN Number of files correctly classified as benign
FP Number of files mistakenly classified as malicious
FN Number of files mistakenly classified as benign
FPR FP/(FP + TN)
Precision TP/(TP + FP)
Recall/TPR TP/(TP + FN)
ACC (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN)
F1 2× Precision× Recall/(Precision + Recall)
three, due to our well designed energy functions and tuned message update as well as
belief read-out.
Figure 3.6: Comparisons of different belief propagation algorithms
Comparisons of Enhanced Belief Propagation Algorithm with Other Classi-
fication Approaches
In this section, we compare the malware detection effectiveness and efficiency of our
proposed EBP algorithm and other classification approaches (Support Vector Machine
(SVM) and Decision Tree (DT)) based on the same dataset in the previous section.
Figure 3.7(a) show that the our proposed EBP algorithm outperforms the other two
classifiers in malware detection effectiveness with the highest TPR and the lowest FPR.
Figure 3.7(b) also shows that the EBP performs better than the other two classifiers in
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malware detection efficiency with detection time of less than 4 second. The computation
complexity of the EBP is O(n2), where n is the number of the file samples.
(a) Detection effectiveness (b) Detection Efficiency
Figure 3.7: Comparisons of malware detection effectiveness and efficiency between EBP
Algorithm and other classification approaches.
Enhanced Belief Propagation Algorithm Applied in Real Industry
In this section, we further evaluate the detection performance of our proposed EBP
based on the large and real data collection from Comodo Cloud Security Center that
includes 69,165 files: 2,883 malware, 19,142 benign files, and 47,140 unknown files. Here,
we use the file labels of the unknown files available two weeks later with the analysis by
the anti-malware experts of Comodo Security Lab for evaluation. 3,653 of the unknown
files are labeled manually: 212 are malware and 3,441 are benign files. Since the sum-
product and AESOP in [121] completely fail in our case, we compare our proposed EBP
with max-sum BP, SVM and DT in this section. The results in Table 3.6, Figure 3.8
demonstrate that our proposed EBP algorithm outperforms others in malware detection
based on the large and real data collection.
Table 3.6: Malare detection comparisons using large and real data collection
Predicting TP FP TN FN ACC
EBP 51 119 2,803 130 0.9197
Max-sum 36 1,698 1,137 117 0.3926
SVM 59 429 3,012 153 0.8407
DT 38 512 2,929 174 0.8019
Remark: we use threshold gap to remove some indistinguishable samples, so TP+FN,
FP+TN are not equal to 212, 3441; these numbers vary in different algorithms either
Chapter 3. Intelligent Malware Detection Utilizing File-to-file Relations 32
(a) Detection comparisons (b) Detection ROC
Figure 3.8: Malare detection comparisons using large and real data collection.
3.3 Active Learning in Malware Detection
In this section, we further gain deeper insight into the file relation graph, which
includes designing its graph-based features, and revealing its relationship characteristics,
and then based on our findings, we propose an active learning framework for malware
detection that applies MSIA to select the representative samples from the unknown files
for labeling and then uses EBP to detect the remaining malware.
3.3.1 Gaining Insight into the Semantic Relatedness
Designing Graph-based Features
To counter malware’s evasion tactics, after the construction of the file-to-file relation
graph, we further investigate several robust graph-based features for malware detection.
Ideal features are either difficult or costly to evade, even when malware is obfuscated.
In this section, on the basis of special characteristics of the file relationships between
malware and benign files, we design five robust and representative graph-based features
for malware detection, which are described in details in the followings.
Vertex degree. The degree of a vertex in a graph is the number of edges incident
to the vertex, which can specifically represent the association between the vertex and
its neighbors [42]. In the file relation graph, we use the degree of malware (DoM) and
degree of benign files (DoB) to capture the association between the file and its neighbors.
These two metrics can be calculated as
DoM(v) = |δvm|, DoB(v) = |δvb |, (3.9)
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where |δvm| is the total number of vertex v’s malicious neighbors, and |δvb | is the total
number of vertex v’s benign neighbors. As the moral says that “ man is known by the
company he keeps”, it’s easy to understand that malware is more likely to have a larger
DoM than DoB, and vice versa. To further support this point, we calculate the degree
for each file in the collected dataset described above: 53.75% of malware have larger
DoM than DoB; while only 3.10% of benign files have larger DoM than DoB.
Influence coefficient. For spammer detection, in [26], the authors used reposting
and commenting coefficients to indicate the ability that a user affects others to repost
or comment. In malware detection, we define the influence coefficient of malware and
benign files by Equation 3.10 and Equation 3.11.
IoM(v) =
∑N
i=1 log(Malware Count(vi) + 1)
N
, (3.10)
IoB(v) =
∑N
i=1 log(Benign Count(vi) + 1)
N
, (3.11)
where N denotes the number of vertex v’s neighbors and vi denotes the i
th neighbor of v.
Malware Count(vi) and Benign Count(vi) represent the number of the malware and
benign files directly connected to vi respectively. A file can directly or indirectly inherit
the goodness or malice from other files. Compared with vertex degree, which considers
the information one-hop away from the node, the feature of influence coefficient takes
the indirect influence from other files into consideration.
Local clustering coefficient. The local clustering coefficient of a vertex in a graph
specifies how close vertices in its neighborhood are to being a clique [138]. For each vertex
in the constructed file relation graph, its local clustering coefficient can be calculated as
[138]
LCC(v) =
2|ev|
kv(kv − 1) , (3.12)
where |ev| is the total number of edges built by all v’s neighbors, and kv is the degree
of the vertex v. For benign files, different users may install different sets of applications
according to their occupations, ages, etc. And these applications are unnecessary to have
associations with each other. However, for malware, just specified groups of users would
be infected by malware. When infected, not only one malicious software would appear
in the client, but also its related files would be released or downloaded. For example,
variants of trojans will always come together with trojan-downloader and co-exist in the
clients. Therefore, malware will have a larger local clustering coefficient than benign
files. To quantitatively validate this, we calculate the local clustering coefficient for each
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file in the collected dataset described above: the average LLC for malware is 0.9387,
while the average LLC for benign files is 0.7573.
Degree centrality. Degree centrality of a vertex is determined by the number of
vertices adjacent to it. The larger the degree, the more important the vertex is [115].
In malware detection, degree centrality can be used to quantify the importance of a file,
which can be computed as [115]
DC(v) =
δ(v)
n− 1 , (3.13)
where δ(v) is the degree of the vertex v, and n is the number of vertices in the graph.
Closeness centrality. Closeness centrality measures the significance of vertices by
quantifying their centrality. Central vertices tend to reach the whole graph more quickly
than non-central vertices [115]. Closeness centrality factors in how close a vertex is to
other vertices, which is computed as [115]
CC(v) =
1
n− 1
n∑
u6=v
g(u, v), (3.14)
where g(u, v) is the distance between the vertex u and vertex v, and n is the number of
vertices in the graph. Malware attackers always use a shotgun approach to find victims
and allure them to download variants of malicious files (e.g., trojans, adware). These files
in the victim clients are always connected through the downloaders. Thus, the closeness
centrality of those downloaders will be high.
Characterization of the Semantic Relatedness
After visualizing the constructed file-to-file relations and designing the graph-based
features, we further analyze its relationship characteristics, and give the following obser-
vations.
Finding 1: A file can greatly inherit the indirect influences from other files
in the file-to-file relations. Again, as the moral says “man is known by the company
he keeps”, in malware detection, a file’s goodness or malice can be judged by the other
files that always co-exist with it in the clients. However, sometimes, a file can not
only be directly influenced by its neighbors, but also greatly inherit the influences from
other files (e.g., its neighbors’ neighbors). Figure 3.9 shows an example that the indirect
influences is superior than the direct influences for file 1880 (marked in yellow node).
To quantitatively validate this finding, we use the features of influence of benign files
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(IoB) and influence of malware (IoM) designed in the above section for measure. For
file 1880, its IoB is 1.6290, while its IoM is just 0.6931, which means this file is more
likely to be influenced by benign files, even though all the files it directly connects with
are malware.
(a) The direct influences from its neighbors (b) The indirect influences from other files
Figure 3.9: Indirect influences superior than direct influences for file 1880 (yellow node)
To further illustrate, based on the collected dataset described in Section 3.1, we
measure the indirect influences from other files for each node. Figure 3.10 displays the
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of IoB and IoM for both malware and benign
files, which shows that both benign files and malware can greatly inherit the goodness
and malice indirectly from other files.
(a) Benign files (b) Malware
Figure 3.10: The comparison of benign files and malware in IoB and IoM measures
Possible Factor: To disseminate the malicious files, it is not uncommon for mal-
ware to be packaged into a software product (especially when it is free and open source)
by the attackers. This would cause such kind of benign software to be closely related
to malicious files, however, their neighbors of neighbors would not necessarily be. On
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the other hand, variants of online game trojans may have indirect associations through
the same kind of online game applications, since they target on stealing specific kind
of online game accounts’ information, but they are unnecessary to co-exist in the same
clients.
From the observation above, we can see that a file’s goodness or malice not only
depends on its neighbors, but also greatly inherit the indirect influences from other files
(e.g., its neighbors’ neighbors). Furthermore, we are also interested to know: (1) Is each
malware of equal importance? (2) If not, what are the differences between the important
malware and non-important ones?
Finding 2: In the file-to-file relations, (1) the importance of each file is
different; (2) the neighbors of the important malware are associated through
it, while the neighbors of the non-important malicious file are inclined to be
a clique.
To initially evaluate the importance of each node, we use degree centrality for measure
(i.e., the importance is to evaluate if the file has high degree in the constructed file
relation graph). Based on the collected dataset described in Section 3.1, we calculate
the degree centrality of each file: about 2% of the malware have the degree centrality
over 0.01, which are 10 – 1000 times larger than the remaining 98% ones. From this
analysis, we can see that the importance of each malware is different: the larger the
degree, the more important the vertex is[115]. Note that there is another interesting
observation that those malware with larger degrees also have higher node weight values
in the graph, which means the “important” malware are always with higher popularity.
We mark those 2% malicious files with higher degree centrality as “important” malware,
compared with the remaining 98% ones. Figure 3.11 (a) displays the CDF of degree
centrality for the important malware and non-important ones.
(a) Degree Centrality (b) Closeness Centrality (c) Clustering Coefficient
Figure 3.11: The comparisons of “important” malware and “non-important” ones.
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To further analyze the different characteristics of the important and non-important
malware, we take insights to their graph structures. Figure 3.12 (a) illustrates an example
of the relationship between an important malware A and its neighbors, while Figure 3.12
(b) shows the relations between its neighbors. From Figure 3.12 (a) and (c), we can see
that both important and non-important malicious nodes with one-hop information have
the star-structures, but the degree centralities of them are different. From Figure 3.12 (b)
and (d), we can see that, the neighbors of the important malware are associated through
it (the closeness centrality of the important malware A is 0.25), while the neighbors of the
non-important malicious file are inclined to be a clique (the local clustering coefficient
LLC of it is equal to 1). Figure 3.11 (b) and (c) display the CDF of local clustering
coefficient and closeness centrality for the important malware and non-important ones
respectively, which also validate the Finding 2.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.12: Graph structure comparisons of “important” and “non-important” malware.
(a) Important malware A and its neighbors; (b) Relations between A’s neighbors; (c)
Non-important malware B and its neighbors; (d) Relations between B’s neighbors [27].
Possible Factor: The importance of each malware is different, since the impacts
different malicious files play are different. For example, a popular trojan or adware
Chapter 3. Intelligent Malware Detection Utilizing File-to-file Relations 38
downloader will infect more clients, compared with the specific kind of trojan or ad-
ware variants. The files co-exist with the popular downloader in different clients are
unnecessary to have a close relationship among them, but are associated through the
downloader; while the files co-exist with the variants of same trojan or adware are prone
to be a clique, since they tend to be the same or similar kind of applications those trojans
or adware target on.
3.3.2 Active Learning Framework
Via empirical analysis for the file-to-file relations, each node vi (i.e., a file sample)
in the constructed graph can be represented by its relations with other nodes and its
graph-based features designed in Section 3.3.1, denoted as Fvi = 〈Rvi, Gvi〉. Rvi can be
defined as
Rvi = 〈v1i, v2i, ..., vni〉, (3.15)
where vji = {0, 1} (i.e., if (vj , vi) ∈ E, vji = 1; otherwise, vji = 0). Gvi can be defined
as
Gvi = 〈DoM(vi), DoB(vi), IoM(vi), IoB(vi), LCC(vi), DC(vi), CC(vi)〉. (3.16)
Representative sample selection from the unknown file collection. To leverage
the feedback from domain experts and thus to further improve the detection accuracy,
selecting representative sample(s) from large unknown file collection for labeling is very
important. For example, before being detected, the newly released Trojan-Downloader
and its related trojans are collected from the user clients and may be marked as un-
known. If we can recognize the Trojan-Downloader and have it labeled, then based
on the constructed file relation graph, using the graph inference algorithm (e.g., EBP
proposed above), its related trojans could be easily detected.
Active learning, as an effective paradigm to address the data scarcity problem, op-
timize the learning benefit from domain experts’ feedback, and reduce the cost of ac-
quiring labeled examples for supervised learning, has been intensively studied in recent
years [93, 94]. In particular, with the abundance of graph and networked data in various
application areas, active learning on graphs has received a lot of research attention [22].
For graph node classification, a general and powerful assumption is that connected nodes
tend to be clustered into the same category, which means they will have the same class
label. This assumption motivated the development of many classification techniques in
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real-world networked data. In our application, Finding 2 demonstrates that the impor-
tance of each file is different and the neighbors of the important malware are associated
through them; therefore, selecting those important and representative malware from the
large unknown file collection for labeling is significantly reasonable to further improve
the detection performance.
In spammer detection, Yang et al. [136] proposed a Malicious Relevance Score Prop-
agation Algorithm (Mr.SPA) to extract criminal supporters, which assigns a malicious
relevance score (MRS) to each Twitter account to quantify how closely this account
follows criminal accounts. In this section, we propose a Malicious Score Inference Algo-
rithm (MSIA), which adapts and improves Mr.SPA [136] to assign a malicious score for
each file to quantify its representativeness.
Given a constructed file relation graph G = (V,E), let n be the number of nodes
(files) in the graph, and I(vi, vj) be the indicator to denote whether (vi, vj) ∈ E (i.e., if
(vi, vj) ∈ E, I(vi, vj) = 1; otherwise, I(vi, vj) = 0). At each step, for each node vi, its
malicious score M(vi) can be calculated as [136]
M(vi) = α ·
n∑
j=1
I(vi, vj)W (vi, vj)M(vj), (3.17)
where α is an adjustable factor, and W (vi, vj) is the weight between vi and vj which
reflects the coordination between each pair of nodes. For each node vi, we calculate the
similarity between itself and each of its neighbors vj based on their presented features
described above, denoted as sim(Fvi, Fvj). Then, the weight W (vi, vj) between node vi
and vj is computed as
W (vi, vj) =
sim(Fvi, Fvj)∑
evkvj∈E sim(Fvk, Fvj)
. (3.18)
In our application, we initialize M0(vi) = {0, 1} (i.e., if vi is malicious, M0(vi) = 1;
otherwise, M0(vi) = 0). Through this malicious score propagation, (1) a file should sum
up the weighted malicious scores inherited from the neighbors, and (2) the malicious
score that a file receives from others should be dampened by the adjustable factor α
[136].
With the consideration of the historical score record for each node, at each step
t(t ≥ 1), an initial score bias (1 − α) ·M0i is added to its malicious score. Thus the
malicious score vector
−→
~M t for all nodes at step t(t ≥ 1) can be computed as [136]
−→
~M t = α ·
−−−−−→
~I · ~M t−1 + (1− α) ·
−→
~M0. (3.19)
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The algorithm MSIA stops when the updates of malicious score vector converge or a
maximum number of the iterations has finished, and then we can obtain final malicious
scores for all files. A threshold will be accordingly specified to determine the important
and representative malware. The higher the malicious score it has, the more important
the file is.
Belief propagation for malware detection. After we recognize the important and
representative malware from the unknown file collection, based on Finding 1 which states
a file’s goodness or malice not only depends on its neighbors, but also indirectly on other
files (e.g., its neighbors’ neighbors), we further apply our proposed EBP algorithm to
detect the remaining malware, since EBP algorithm can propagate the indirect influences
from other files for each node. The implementation of our proposed active learning
framework is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: MSIA+EBP - An active learning framework for mal-
ware detection
Input: G = (V,E): undirected weighted file relation graph(s), α:
adjustable factor
Output: class label of each file
Initialize (file states, malicious score
−→
~M0, t = 1): if vi is malicious,
M0(vi) = 1; otherwise, M
0(vi) = 0;
Calculate the similarity sim(Fvi, Fvj) for each pair of nodes vi and vj ;
Calculate the weights W s for each pair of nodes in G;
while malicious scores haven’t converged or iteration hasn’t finished do
Calculate
−→
~M t;
t = t+ 1
end
Label k files with the highest malicious scores (> threshold) as malware;
Use EBP (Algorithm 1) to label the remaining files;
3.3.3 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we conduct three sets of experiments based on the collected dataset
obtained from Comodo Cloud Security Center: (1) In the first set of experiments, we
use MSIA to evaluate the effectiveness of the designed features; (2) In the second set
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of experiments, we further evaluate our proposed active learning framework in malware
detection; (3) In the last set of experiments, we compare our proposed framework with
other classification methods (i.e., SVM, Decision Tree, and Na¨ıve Bayes). We measure
the malware detection performance of different methods using the evaluation measures
shown in Table 3.5. All the experiments are conducted under the environment of 64
Bit Windows 7 operating system with 4th Generation Intel Core i7 Processor (Quad
Core, 8MB Cache, up to 4.0GHz w/ Turbo Boost) plus 16G of RAM using Apache Pig,
MySQL and C++.
Evaluation of the Designed Features
For each sample in the constructed file-to-file relations, we extract its relations with
other samples described in Section 3.1 and its graph-based features designed in Sec-
tion 3.3.1 for representation. In this section, we conduct the experiments using MSIA
to evaluate the effectiveness of the designed features. The collected dataset from Co-
modo Cloud Security Center contains 60,724 files: 9,893 are malware, 19,402 are benign
files, and 31,429 are unknown (with the analysis by anti-malware experts of Comodo
Security Lab, 470 of them are labeled as malware and 1,273 of them are benign files).
Those 9,893 malware and 19,402 benign files are used for training, while 470 malware
and 1,273 benign files from the unknown file collection which are labeled by anti-malware
experts are used for testing. The results in Table 3.7 demonstrate the effectiveness of the
designed features in malware detection: though the graph-based features (GF) perform
worse than the relations formulated by neighborhood (RF), the concatenation of these
two types of features can significantly improve the detection performance.
Table 3.7: Evaluation of the designed graph-based features
Training TP FP TN FN ACC
MSIA(RF ) 7,392 1,301 18,101 2,501 0.8702
MSIA(GF ) 6,960 2,410 16,992 2,933 0.8176
MSIA(RF +GF ) 7,890 1,371 18,031 2,003 0.8848
Testing TP FP TN FN ACC
MSIA(RF ) 293 78 1,195 177 0.8537
MSIA(GF ) 179 122 1,151 291 0.7631
MSIA(RF +GF ) 315 78 1,195 155 0.8663
RF denotes the file relation features of the samples, while GF denotes the graph-based features of the samples.
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Evaluation of the Proposed Learning Framework
In this section, we further evaluate our proposed active learning framework in mal-
ware detection: (1) Based on the training and testing sets described in the previous
section, we compare the performance of MSIA and EBP in malware detection; (2) To
further improve the detection accuracy, we first apply MSIA for representative samples
selection (193 samples are selected from the unknown file collection for labeling), and
then use EBP for detection. The results in Table 3.8 show that our proposed framework
composed of MSIA and EBP (MSIA+EBP) can greatly improve the accuracy in malware
detection, compared with using MSIA and EBP respectively, or EBP after randomly se-
lecting 193 samples from the unknown file collection for labeling (Random+EBP).
Table 3.8: Evaluation of the proposed learning framework in malware detection
Training TP FP TN FN ACC
MSIA 7,890 1,371 18,031 2,003 0.8848
EBP 9,881 866 18,536 12 0.9700
Random+EBP 10,059 870 18,545 14 0.9701
MSIA+EBP 10,060 851 18,564 13 0.9707
Testing TP FP TN FN ACC
MSIA 315 78 1,195 155 0.8663
EBP 411 119 1,154 59 0.8979
Random+EBP 462 204 1,069 8 0.8784
MSIA+EBP 437 100 1,173 33 0.9236
The example shown in Figure 3.13 further illustrates that, with three representative
samples (orange ones in Figure 3.13(a)) selected, the related unknown files (yellow ones
in Figure 3.13(a)) are correctly classified. Figure 3.13(b) shows the final detection results.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.13: An example of malware detection using active learning framework.
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Comparisons with Other Alternative Detection Methods
In this section, we further compare our proposed framework with other classifica-
tion methods (Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree (DT), and Na¨ıve Bayes
(NB)) resting upon the same testing dataset described in the previous section. The
results in Table 3.9 and the ROC curves for the cross-validation experiments based on
the testing set in Figure 3.14(a) demonstrate that our proposed framework composed
of MSIA and EBP (MSIA+EBP) is superior to SVM, DT, and NB in malware de-
tection. Figure 3.14(b) shows that the detection efficiency of our proposed algorithms
outperform other classification methods. The success of MSIA+EBP lies in the proper
consideration and accommodation of the property of active learning, and the advantage
of semi-supervised framework that makes use of labeled and unlabeled data for training.
Table 3.9: Comparisons of different detection methods
Training TP FP TN FN ACC
SVM 8,661 797 18,618 1,412 0.9251
DT 8,308 1,761 17,654 1,765 0.8804
NB 5,288 502 18,913 4,785 0.8207
MSIA+EBP 10,060 851 18,564 13 0.9707
Testing TP FP TN FN ACC
SVM 452 172 1,101 18 0.8910
DT 412 241 1,032 58 0.8285
NB 159 31 1,242 311 0.8037
MSIA+EBP 437 100 1,173 33 0.9236
(a) ROC curves (b) Detection Efficiency
Figure 3.14: Comparisons of ROC curves and detection efficiency of different methods
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3.4 Graph Representation Learning for Malware Detection
Despite the BP algorithm can propagate the indirect influence from other files, it
merely preserves the graph structure information by considering short and fixed neigh-
borhood information, i.e., the first and second order proximities, which cannot capture
long-range structure over file-to-file relation graph. To address this issue, in this section,
we present a sequence modeling method file2vec to learn representations for files over
graph to capture more meaningful proximity: given a set of file sequences generated
using random walk, a seq2seq model [120] Long Short-term Memory (LSTM) [120, 6, 35]
is introduced to read the input file sequence to obtain a fixed-length summary vector
from which another LSTM is employed to generate the output sequence (i.e., encoding
and decoding the file sequences), through which the fixed-dimensional representation for
each file will be learned.
3.4.1 Representation Learning using Long Short-term Memory
Given a graph G = (V,E), the graph representation learning task is to learn
a function f : V → Rd that maps each node v ∈ V to a vector in a d -dimensional
space Rd, d  |V | that is capable to preserve the structural relations among them.
In our application, the files in the constructed file relation graph can be connected
through different number of nodes (i.e., files) and edges (i.e., co-occurrence relations).
For example, as shown in Figure 3.15, file B4 can be connected to file B5 through Seq2,
and connected to file M2 through Seq4 as well. It’s recalled that Belief Propagation
updates a node’s message from its neighbor node considering all the messages flowing
into its neighbor node; this method only takes consideration of the first and second order
neighbors while fails to directly learn the long-range relatedness between files like B4 and
M2, and B5 and M2. To fully capture the graph structure information to represent each
file over graph, this calls for a new method for representation learning.
Since the graph structure information is preserved by file sequences (e.g., Seq1 -
Seq4 in Figure 3.15), the sequence modeling method can seamlessly fuse the long-range
graph structure information into the final learned representations [86]. The sequence to
sequence models (seq2seq) have been successfully applied to machine translation [6, 35],
and Natural Language Processing (NLP) problems [55] in recent years. The rationale
using seq2seq for representation learning is to deploy a Long Short-term Memory (LSTM)
to read the input sequence, one at each timestep, to obtain an overall sequence vector
representation, and then deploy another LSTM to extract the output sequence from
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Figure 3.15: Neighborhood relationships among files.
that vector [86]. The structure information is seamlessly incorporated into the latent
vectors of hidden layers, which can be effectively used as the representations of nodes.
In the following, we will introduce how to use file2vec for representation learning of files
over graph. We will first present file sequence generation using random walk, and then
leverage LSTM for the generated file sequence modeling.
File sequence generation using random walk. Given a source node vj in a graph,
the random walk is a stochastic process with random variables v1j , v
2
j , ..., v
k
j such that v
k+1
j
is a node chosen at random from the neighbors of node vk. The transition probability
p(vi+1j |vij) at step i is the normalized probability distributed over the neighbors of vij ,
which can be denoted as:
p(vi+1j |vij) =
1
|N(vij)|
, (3.20)
where N(vij) denotes the neighborhood of node v
i
j . The walk paths (i.e., sequences)
generated by the above strategy are able to preserve structural relations between different
nodes in the graph, and thus will facilitate the representation learning using LSTM.
File sequence modeling using LSTM. A LSTM is an architecture designed for
recurrent neural network to address the vanishing/exploding gradient issue [120, 64].
In general, LSTM learns a mapping from an input sequence (i.e., (x1, ...,xT ), where
xt ∈ Rn is a vector at timestep t) to an output sequence. As intermediate output,
LSTM generates a vector ht ∈ Rd for each timestep. By furthering pooling all the ht’s,
we can output the embedding vectors. In our application, given an input file sequence
(v1,v2, ...,vk) where vt ∈ R|V | is a |V |-dimensional one-hop vector at timestep t, we
will employ an encoder-decoder LSTM architecture [35] (as illustrated in Figure 3.16)
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for file sequence modeling, in which hidden layer vectors are elaborately extracted as
the representations for the corresponding files to improve the quality of representation
learning.
Figure 3.16: Illustration of encoder-decoder LSTM architecture.
Encoder: The LSTM encodes the input file sequence (v1,v2, ...,vk) through the
hidden layer function H so that each hidden layer vector het at timestep t can be denoted
as
het = H(vt,het−1), (3.21)
where H is implemented using purpose-built memory cells to store information, which
can be formulated as the following composite functions [55]:
it = σ(Wxivt + Whih
e
t−1 + Wcict−1 + bi) (3.22)
ft = σ(Wxfvt + Whfh
e
t−1 + Wcfct−1 + bf ) (3.23)
ct = ft ◦ ct−1 + it ◦ tanh(Wxcvt + Whchet−1 + bc) (3.24)
ot = σ(Wxovt + Whoh
e
t−1 + Wcoct−1 + bo) (3.25)
het = ot ◦ tanh(ct) (3.26)
where σ is the logistic sigmoid function, it, ft, ot, ct are the input gate, forget gate,
output gate, and cell activation vectors respectively, Ws are the weight matrices, bs are
the bias vectors, and ◦ is the point-wise product between two vectors. After reading vk,
the hidden state hek is used as the summary vector s of the whole input sequence.
Decoder: The summary vector s is fed back into the LSTM’s first hidden layer so
that hd0 = s, and then each hidden layer vector h
d
t at timestep t can be calculated as
hdt = H(0,hdt−1), (3.27)
where 0 is an all-zero vector. Accordingly, the output vector yt ∈ R|V | can be formulated
as follows [55]:
yt = σ(Whyh
d
t + by). (3.28)
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yt is capable to predict the real file vt through a softmax layer. The sequence loss L is
adopted to measure the correctness of decoding, which is computed as
L = −
k∑
t=1
log p(vt|yt)
= −
k∑
t=1
log
exp(yvtt )∑|V |
i=1 exp(y
vi
t )
.
(3.29)
The weights can be efficiently calculated with backpropagation through time [130, 55],
and the LSTM model can then be trained using Adam optimization algorithm.
For the generated file sequences, each file may appear in multiple sequences. Suppose
that file vi exists in |vi| sequences, by doing concatenation of max and avg pooling over
all hej ’s for file vi, ∀j = 1, 2, ..., |vi|, we obtain an embedding h for each file:
h = maxavgPooling({hej : j = 1, ..., |vi|}). (3.30)
Using file2vec, the mapped feature vectors of files, encoding the informaiton of graph
structure, can be fed to a classifier to train the classification model, based on which the
unlabeled files can be predicted if they are malicious or not. The implementation of
file2vec is illustrated in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: file2vec - A graph representation learning model for
malware detection
Input: G = (V,E), walks per node r, length l, and vector dimension d,
training data set Dt, testing data set De
Output: class label of each file
for i = 1→ |V | do
for j = 1→ r do
get l-length random walk path using Eq. 3.20;
end
Use LSTM to model paths generated and output he ∈ Rd;
end
h = maxavgPooling({hej : j = 1, ..., |vi|}) for each file;
Train SVM using hDt ;
for n = 1→ |De| do
Generate the label using trained SVM;
end
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3.4.2 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we conduct three sets of experimental studies using the same data
collected from Comodo Cloud Security used in Section 3.3.3 to fully evaluate the per-
formance of our proposed representation learning method file2vec in malware detection.
We use the same performance indices shown in Table 3.5.
Evaluation of file2vec
In this set of experiments, we evaluate our proposed method file2vec by comparisons
with another popular representation learning method DeepWalk [104] using random walk
and skip-gram. The parameter settings used for file2vec are in line with typical values
used for the baseline: vector dimension d = 200, walks per node r = 15, and walk
length l = 50. To facilitate the comparisons, we randomly select a portion of labeled
files (ranging in {10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, 90%}) from 9,893 malware and 19,402 benign
files for training and the remaining ones for testing to evaluate their performances. The
SVM is used as the classification model for both DeepWalk and file2vec.
Table 3.10 illustrates the detection results of different representation learning meth-
ods. From Table 3.10, we can see that DeepWalk performs slightly better than file2vec
when the portion of training data is 10% and 50%, but the difference is not statistically
significant; when the training data reaches to 70%, and 90%, file2vec performs better for
malware detection in terms of ACC and F1. That is to say, file2vec learns significantly
better file representation than current state-of-the-art method. The success of file2vec
stems from the sophisticated sequence modeling, which leverages the advantage of long-
range graph structure. More importantly, DeepWalk assigns each file a static embedding
vector based on all sequences, while LSTM reads the whole input sequence to further
generate the output sequence, and its learned representations tend to be context-aware
to different sequences it interacts with.
Table 3.10: Comparisons of file2vec with DeepWalk in malware detection
Metric Method 10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
ACC
DeepWalk 0.7482 0.8029 0.8541 0.9121 0.9267
file2vec 0.7380 0.8101 0.8424 0.9221 0.9438
F1
DeepWalk 0.5701 0.6710 0.7606 0.8646 0.8890
file2vec 0.5500 0.6864 0.7395 0.8829 0.9167
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Comparisons with Other Alternative Methods
In this set of experiments, based on the dataset used in Section 3.3.3, we compare
file2vec with other alternative machine learning methods. For these methods, we con-
struct three types of features: f–1 : relation-based features (i.e., file co-occurrence used in
Section 3.2); f–2 : concatenation of relation-based features and graph-based features (i.e.,
Fv introduced in Section 3.1); f–3 : representations learned by file2vec. Based on these
features, we consider five classification models, i.e., NB on f–1 and f–2, SVM on f–1 and
f–2, EBP on f–1, MSIA+EBP on f–2, and file2vec on f–3. The experimental results are
illustrated in Table 3.11. From the results we can observe that feature engineering (f-2 :
concatenation of relation- and graph- based features) helps the performance of machine
learning, and active learning also facilitates malware detection, but file2vec that encodes
the graph structure and the long-range influence among files learned from LSTM signif-
icantly outperforms other baselines. This again demonstrates that, to detect malware,
file2vec using sequence modeling is able to achieve better detection performance.
Table 3.11: Comparisons with other machine learning methods
Metric
NB SVM
EBP MSIA+EBP file2vec
f-1 f-2 f-1 f-2
ACC 0.8037 0.8101 0.8909 0.8967 0.8978 0.9236 0.9454
F1 0.4818 0.5052 0.8263 0.8348 0.8220 0.8679 0.9023
Evaluation of Parameter Sensitivity
In this set of experiments, based on the dataset used in Section 3.3.3, we conduct
the sensitivity analysis of how different choices of parameters (i.e., walks per node r,
walk length l, and vector dimension d) will affect the performance of file2vec in malware
detection. From the results shown in Figure 3.17(a) and 3.17(b), we can observe that
the balance between computational cost (number of walks per node r and walk length
l in x-axis) and efficacy (F1 in y-axis) can be achieved when r = 15 and l = 60 for
malware detection. We also examine how vector dimensions (d) affect the performance.
As shown in Figure 3.17(c) we can find that the performance inclines to be stable when
d increases to around 300. Overall, file2vec is not strictly sensitive to these parameters,
and is able to reach high performance under a cost-effective parameter choice.
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Figure 3.17: Parameter sensitivity evaluation.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we provide deep analysis of file-to-file relations between malware
and benign files and study how the file co-existence relation graphs can be constructed.
Resting on the constructed file-to-file relation graphs, we first design an enhanced Belief
Propagation algorithm for unknown file labeling that fine tunes various components used
in the algorithm and formulates the new message and belief read-out functions; then
we investigate several new and robust graph-based features for malware detection and
reveal the characteristics of file relations, based on which we propose an effective active
learning framework (MSIA+EBP) for malware detection; last, we leverage a sequence
modeling method Long Short-term Memory to learn the representations of files in our
constructed graph which captures the long-range structural information. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first investigation of the relationship characteristics for the file-
to-file relations in malware detection using social network analysis. Due to the difficulty
in thoroughly obtaining the social interactions and motivations of malware, we recognize
that the validations on some proposed explanations are not entirely rigorous. However,
we believe that our novel analysis of those phenomena still yields great value and unveils
a new avenue for better understanding malware’s file relation ecosystem. The research
work conducted in this chapter have been also published in the following papers:
• Lingwei Chen, William Hardy, Yanfang Ye  , Tao Li. “Analyzing File-to-File
Relation Network in Malware Detection”, International Conference on Web Infor-
mation Systems Engineering (WISE), 415–430, 2015.
• Lingwei Chen, Tao Li, Melih Abdulhayoglu, Yanfang Ye  . “Intelligent Malware
Detection Based on File Relation Graphs”, IEEE International Conference on Se-
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matic Computing (ICSC), 85–92, 2015.
• Shifu Hou, Lingwei Chen, Yanfang Ye  , Lifei Chen. “Deep Analysis and Uti-
lization of Malware’s Social Relation Network for Its Detection”, Asia-Pacific Web
(APWeb) and Web-Age Information Management (WAIM) Joint Conference on
Web and Big Data, 31–42, 2017.
• Yanfang Ye  , Shifu Hou, Lingwei Chen, Jingwei Lei, Wenqiang Wan, Jiabin Wang,
Qi Xiong, Fudong Shao. “AiDroid: When Heterogeneous Information Network
Marries Deep Neural Network for Real-time Android Malware Detection”, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1811.01027, 2018.
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Chapter 4
Enhancing Security of
Learning-based Systems in
Malware Detection
The existing works [149, 69, 47] and the work in the previous section have demon-
strated that relation-based features integrated with file contents are more resilient against
malware attacks compared to content-based only representations. However, as machine
learning-based detection systems become more widely deployed, the adversary incen-
tive for defeating them increases. Therefore, we go further insight into the arms race
between adversarial malware attack and defense, and aim to enhance the security of
machine learning-based detection systems. In this chapter, we focus on the studies on
the following research questions:
• How can we define adversarial malware attack?
• In response to the adversary’s strategy, how can we design an adversary-aware
learning model based on the skills and capacities of the attackers to enhance the
security of machine Learning-based malware detection?
• Since it is computationally expensive and almost impossible to find all adversarial
models, can we design defensive learning models whose action space is practically
independent from the attacks?
On the basis of a learning-based classifier with the input of different feature representa-
tions extracted from the Portable Executable (PE) files and Android application (app)
files respectively, we investigate the adversarial malware attacks and aim to enhance
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security of machine learning-based detection against such attacks. In particular, we first
explore the adversarial attacks corresponding to the different scenarios, thoroughly as-
sess the adversary behaviors through feature manipulations, adversarial cost, and attack
goals, and accordingly present a general attack strategy. Resting on the learning-based
classifier which is degraded by the adversarial malware attacks, we propose three secure-
learning paradigms SecDefender, SecureDroid, and Droideye, either depending on or
independent from the skills and capabilities of the attackers, to counter these adversarial
attacks, and thus enhance the security of the classifier while not compromising its detec-
tion accuracy. The proposed methods can be readily applied in other malware detection
tasks.
4.1 Problem Definition
Machine Learning-based Classifier for Malware Detection. A malware detec-
tion system using machine learning techniques attempts to identify variants of known
malware or zero-day malware through building a classification model based on the la-
beled training samples and predefined feature representations, which is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. More specifically, the problem of machine learning-based malware detection
Figure 4.1: Intelligent malware detection system using machine learning techniques.
can be stated in the form of: f : X → Y which assigns a label y ∈ Y (i.e., −1 or +1) to an
input file sample x ∈ X through the learning function f . A general linear classification
model for malware detection can be thereby denoted as:
f = sign(f(X)) = sign(XTw + b), (4.1)
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where f is a vector, each of whose elements is the label (i.e., malicious or benign) of a file
to be predicted, each column of matrix X is the feature vector of a file, w is the weight
vector and b is the biases. Typically, a machine learning system on the basis of a linear
classifier can be formalized as an optimization problem [149]:
argmin
f ,w,b;ξ
1
2
||y − f ||2 + 1
2β
wTw +
1
2γ
bTb + ξT (f −XTw − b), (4.2)
subject to Eq. (4.1), where y is the labeled information vector, ξ is Lagrange multiplier
which is a strategy for finding the local minima of 12 ||y− f ||2 subject to f−XTw−b = 0,
β and γ are the regularization parameters, and 12βw
Tw and 12γh
Th are regularization
terms to deal with the overfitting problem in the learning model. Note that Eq. (4.2)
is a general linear classifier (denoted as Original-Classifier throughout the chapter) con-
sisting of specific loss function and regularization terms. Without loss of generality, the
equation can be transformed into different linear models depending on the choices of loss
function and regularization terms, such as Logistic Regression (LR) and Support Vector
Machine (SVM).
Security Violation. In malware detection, the learner’s purpose is to classify malware
and prevent them from interfering users’ computers. In contrast, adversaries would like
to violate the security context by either (a) allowing malicious files to be misclassified as
false negatives (an integrity attack) or (b) creating a denial of service in which benign
files are incorrectly classified as false positives (an availability attack). In other words,
there are two types of security violations the adversaries cause [10, 11]: (1) Evasion
attack (also called integrity attack) manipulates malicious samples at test time to have
them misclassified as benign without having influence over the training data; (2) Poi-
soning attack (also called availability attack) injects poisoning samples into the training
data to create a denial of service that disables benign files being normally executed. In
this dissertation, we focus on the former attack. We call evasion attack as adversarial
attack throughout the dissertation. Security violation can be targeted or indiscrimi-
nate, depending on whether the attacker is interested in having some specific malware
misclassified, or if any misclassified malware sample meets his/her goal [41].
4.2 Adversarial Attack
Adversarial attacks can generally be modeled as an optimization problem: given
an original malicious file x ∈ X+, the adversarial attacks attempt to manipulate its
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features to be detected as benign (i.e., x′ ∈ X−), with the minimal adversarial cost. In
this section, we present how attackers can achieve such attacks.
Considering that the attacker may have different levels of knowledge of the targeted
learning system [126], he may know completely, partially, or do not have any informa-
tion about: (i) the feature extraction method, (ii) the training sample set, and (iii) the
learning algorithm. We characterize the attacker’s knowledge in terms of a space Ψ that
encodes knowledge of the feature space X, the training sample set D, and the classifi-
cation function f . In the traditional detection evasions, we mainly discuss the scenario
that the attackers using techniques such as encryption, obfuscation, and polymorphism
to probe the classifier without any knowledge of the learning system (i.e., Ψ = ()). In this
section, we wish to follow the common practice in cyber security research of erring on
the side of overestimating the attackers’ capabilities rather than underestimating them.
Therefore, based on the different scenarios, we present three well-defined adversarial
attacks to facilitate security analysis of the classifier as below.
Mimicry Attacks In this scenario, the attackers are assumed to know the feature
space and be able to obtain a collection of malware samples and benign files to imitate
the original training dataset. In other words, Ψ = (X, Dˆ). In such attack, the strategy
of the attackers is to manipulate a set of features (e.g., Windows API calls) to probe
the learning system. The effectiveness of this adversarial attack mainly depends on the
similarity of distribution between the original training dataset and mimic dataset. It’s
more likely that the attackers may evade the detection if the file samples drawn from
surrogate dataset are distributed closely as the training sample set.
Imperfect-knowledge Attacks Further than the previous scenario, we assume that
both the feature space and the original training sample set can be fully controlled by
the attackers, i.e., Ψ = (X,D). Compared with mimicry attacks, the knowledge of
the malware and benign files in the original training dataset definitely leverage clearer
insight for the attackers to conduct the adversarial attacks to evade the learning system’s
detection, although they may have no knowledge of the learning algorithm.
Ideal-knowledge Attacks This is the worst case where the learning algorithm is
also known to the attackers, i.e., Ψ = (X,D, f). Although many settings do impose
significant restrictions on getting the ideal knowledge by the attackers, including the
feature space, the training sample set and the classification function, we would like
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to overestimate the attackers’ capabilities rather than underestimate them. When the
attackers can perfectly access to the learning system, they can thoroughly analyze the
malware and benign files in the training dataset, investigate the vulnerability of the
classification algorithm, and accurately manipulate the features to evade the detection.
All these advantages contribute to an effective adversarial attack, which has the strongest
probability of evading the targeted learning system. Since this worst case provides a
potential upper bound on the performance degradation suffered by the learning system
under the adversarial attacks, it can be used as reference to evaluate the effectiveness of
the learning system under the other simulated attack scenarios.
Figure 4.2 depicts the aforementioned adversarial attacks according to different levels
of knowledge the attackers may have.
Figure 4.2: Different scenarios of the adversarial attacks. With the direction of the
inward arrow, the adversarial attacks are depicted with the knowledge of (X, Dˆ), (X,D),
and (X,D, f).
4.2.1 Feature Manipulation
To conduct an adversarial attack, attackers would manipulate the features of a ma-
licious file to evade the detection. Feature manipulation defines how malware samples
can be modified, according to program-specific constraints [41]; these constraints can be
encoded in terms of distances in feature space, computed between the source malware
data and its manipulated versions, which will be discussed in the next section. Given a
file, after feature extraction, it can be represented by a binary feature vector. Then a
typical manipulation can be either adding or eliminating a binary in the vector.
• Feature Addition. In this scenario, attackers can autonomously inject a feature
in the file (i.e., set 0 to 1). For example, they can add API calls in a file without
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influence on other existing functionalities; they can also inject API calls in a dead
code or methods which will be never called by any invoke instructions in a file.
• Feature Elimination. In this setting, attackers may hide or remove a feature
from the file (i.e., set 1 to 0) while not affecting the intrusive functionality they
want to execute. For example, attackers can hide the information stored as strings
by encryption and decrypting it at runtime.
Either feature addition or elimination, both settings should retain the semantics
and intrusive functionality of the original file after manipulations. In such case, feature
addition is easier and safer when the injection is not directly executed by the file (as
examples shown above). However, if attackers want to inject a suspicious API call to the
file being executed by the program, it will be more sophisticated and may influence the
semantics of the file. Feature elimination is usually more complicated, such as, removing
API calls from a file is not always practical since it may limit the functionalities of the file.
Therefore, conducting an adversarial attack that needs to manipulate a lot of features
while not compromising the malicious functionalities may not always be feasible. In this
respect, attackers may need to implement a well-crafted attack by taking consideration
of the adversarial cost.
4.2.2 Adversarial Cost
The adversarial cost can be defined in terms of distances in feature space between the
original malware and its manipulated version; simply, it can be decided by the number
of binaries that are changed from x to x′ by attackers, which is denoted as
C(x′,x) = ||cT (x′ − x)||pp, (4.3)
where c is a vector whose element denotes the corresponding cost of changing a feature,
and p is a real number. The adversarial cost function can be considered as `1-norm or
`2-norm depending on the feature space. For attackers, the manipulation cost ci for each
feature is different. For example, some specific Windows API calls may affect the struc-
ture for intrusive functionality, which are more expensive to be modified. Therefore, the
manipulation cost ci for each feature is practically significant, which is determined by the
feature type and manipulation method. Furthermore, for the reasons aforementioned,
it’s impractical for attackers to modify a malware into benign at any cost (i.e., manip-
ulating a large number of features). For instance, an adware will automatically display
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or download advertisements when the victim is online. The attacker will not modify its
related API calls to make the adware being benign and loss its malicious functionalities.
Thus, there is an upper limit of the maximum manipulations that can be made to the
original malware x. That is, the manipulation function A(x) can be formulated as
A(x) =
x
′ sign(f(x′)) = −1 and C(x′,x) ≤ δmax
x otherwise
, (4.4)
where the malware is manipulated to be misclassified as benign only if the adversarial
cost is less than or equal to a maximum cost δmax.
4.2.3 Attack Strategy
In practice, though attackers may know differently about the targeted learning sys-
tem [126], they always have the following two competing objectives: (1) maximize the
number of malicious files being classified as benign, and (2) minimize the adversarial cost
for optimal attacks over the learning-based classifier [83]. Specifically, the adversarial
attack strategy can be formulated as:
argmin
x′∈X−
min{f(x′), 0}+ C(x′,x), (4.5)
subject to C(x′,x) ≤ δmax.
Given an original malware, an effective adversarial attack generally modifies a small
portion of features with the low adversarial cost. Let Eq. (4.5) return an optimal solution
x∗ with sign(f(x∗)) = −1, and a suboptimal solution x˜ with sign(f(x˜)) = −1, we
characterize the relationship between x∗ and x˜, and have
min{f(x∗), 0} = min{f(x˜), 0} = −1.
The difference between x∗ and x˜ can be simplified as the comparison between their
adversarial costs, i.e., argmin C(x′,x). According to the definition of the adversarial
cost in Eq. (4.3), C(x′,x) ≥ 0. C(x′,x) = 0 iff x′ = x. C(·) is then strictly convex in x′
and has a unique solution for this optimization problem. Therefore, C(x∗,x) < C(x˜,x),
since x∗ is an optimal attack. The adversarial cost varies resting on the different levels
of knowledge the attackers have about the targeted learning system. We formalize this
relationship between x∗ and x˜ in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose x∗ is the optimal adversarial attack to Eq. (4.5), while x˜ is sub-
optimal attack, s.t., f(x∗) < 0 and f(x˜) < 0. Then C(x∗,x) < C(x˜,x). That is, the
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optimal adversarial attack can access to the learning-based system with minimum adver-
sarial cost.
According to this lemma, to perform an optimal adversarial attack, attacker may
want to select the features that are easy to be manipulated (e.g., addition is generally
easier than elimination) and to choose the features that have higher contributions to
the classification problem. This inspires us to design secure defenses to combat the
adversarial attack strategy.
4.3 SecDefender : A Secure-learning Model against Well-
crafted Attack
In this section, on the basis of Windows API calls extracted from the PE files, we
first present a well-crafted adversarial attack model (named AdvAttack) to thoroughly
assess the security of the classifier by considering different contributions of the API calls
to the classification problem. To effectively counter such adversarial attacks, we further
propose a resilient yet elegant secure-learning model (named SecDefender) based on
AdvAttack for malware detection. The system architecture of SecDefender is shown in
Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: An overview of system architecture of SecDefender. In this system, the
collected PE files are first represented as d-dimensional binary feature vectors. Then a
well-crafted adversarial attack model AdvAttack is formulated to generate the adversarial
examples, which will be further used for classifier retraining and security regularization.
For a new file, based on the extracted features, it will be predicted as either malicious
or benign based on the trained classification model.
4.3.1 Feature Representation
PE is designed as a common file format for all flavors of Windows operating system,
and malicious PE files are in the majority of the malware in recent years [140]. Based
on the collected PE file sample set, without loss of generality, in this section, we extract
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Windows API calls as the features to represent the file samples, since they can effectively
reflect the behaviors of program codes [140]. For example, the API “GetFileType” in
“KERNEL32.DLL” can be used to retrieve the file type of the specified file, while the API
“GetDlgItemText” in “USER32.DLL” is utilized to obtain the title or text associated
with a control in a dialog box. Before feature extraction, if a PE file is previously
compressed by a third party binary compress tool such as UPX and ASPack Shell or
embedded a homemade packer, it will be decompressed at first and we use the dissembler
CMDsm developed by Comodo Anti-malware Lab to dissemble the PE code and output
the assembly instructions as the input for the Windows API call extraction.
In this section, we perform static analysis on the collected file samples and extract
the above features (i.e., Windows API calls) to represent the files. Though static anal-
ysis has unequivocal limitations, since it is not feasible to analyze malicious code that
is thoroughly obfuscated or decrypted at runtime. For this reason, considering such at-
tacks would be irrelevant for the scope of our work. Our focus is rather to understand
and to enhance the security properties of learning-based system against a wide class of
adversarial attacks. The above features are exploited as a case study which facilitate the
understanding of our further proposed approach, while other feature extractions, such
as binary n-gram, dynamic system calls, and dynamic behaviors, are also applicable in
our further investigation.
To represent each collected PE file, we first extract the features and convert them into
a vector space, so that it can be fed to the classifier either for training or testing. Based
on the extracted features, we denote our dataset D to be of the form D = {xi, yi}ni=1
of n file samples, where xi is the set of features extracted from file i, and yi is the class
label of file i, where yi ∈ {+1,−1, 0} (+1 denotes malicious, −1 denotes benign, and 0
denotes unknown). Let d be the number of all extracted features in the dataset D. Each
of the PE file can be represented by a binary feature vector:
xi =

0
1
. . .
1
0

→
KERNEL32.DLL,VirtualQuery;
KERNEL32.DLL,Sleep;
. . .
USER32.DLL,DestroyIcon;
KERNEL32.DLL,SetEvent

Windows API calls (4.6)
where xi ∈ Rd, and xij = {0, 1} (i.e., if file i includes feature j, then xij = 1; otherwise,
xij = 0).
Chapter 4. Enhancing Security of Learning-based Systems in Malware Detection 61
4.3.2 Well-crafted Attack Model AdvAttack
Characteristics of the Feature Set
Since it’s the most important for the attackers to choose a relevant subset of features
applied for addition and elimination, to well implement the attack, we take deep insight
into the property of the feature set. As different features (i.e., API calls in our applica-
tion) differently contribute to the classification of malware and benign files, it’s worth
to investigate the importance of each feature. We analyze the sample set obtained from
Comodo Cloud Security Center, which contains 10,000 labeled files with 3, 503 extracted
API calls. There are various methods for assessing feature relevance (e.g., information
gain, χ2 contingency table statistic, etc.) in classification, each of which has its own
pros and cons [59]. Here we use Max-Relevance algorithm [103], which is one of the
popular approaches to define dependency of variables and has also been successfully ap-
plied in malware detection [147], to calculate the relevance score of each API call for the
classification of malware and benign file respectively. Given x representing an API call,
and the file label y, their mutual information is defined in terms of their frequencies of
appearances P (x), P (y), and p(x, y) as follows [147]:
I(x, y) =
∫ ∫
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
P (x)P (y)
dxdy. (4.7)
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the relevance scores of the extracted API calls for
the classification of malware and benign files, from which we can see that for those
with high relevance scores, some are explicitly relevant to malware, while some have
high influence on the classification of benign files. Note that API calls with extremely
low relevance scores (about 85% lower than 0.0005) have limited or no contributions
in malware detection (e.g., SetLocalTime in KERNEL32.DLL), thus they will not be
considered for the further investigated adversarial attacks.
Figure 4.4: Relevance score distribution of the extracted API calls for the classification
of malware and benign files
To further analyze the different importances of API calls for the classification of
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malware and benign files, we take insights into their specific functionalities. Table 4.1
shows the top ranked API calls related to malware and benign files respectively.
Table 4.1: List of the top ranked API calls
ID API Contributing to Malware Classification Rel. Score
178 KERNEL32.DLL,VirtualQuery; 0.0568
124 KERNEL32.DLL,ExitProcess; 0.0459
615 KERNEL32.DLL,CreateFileW; 0.0406
607 KERNEL32.DLL,CompareStringA; 0.0381
8 USER32.DLL,RegisterClassA; 0.0355
1637 USER32.DLL,DestroyIcon; 0.0318
1606 USER32.DLL,TrackPopupMenu; 0.0317
207 KERNEL32.DLL,IsBadCodePtr; 0.0235
1601 USER32.DLL,CreatePopupMenu; 0.0213
235 USER32.DLL,DestroyWindow; 0.0205
ID API Contributing to Benign File Classification Rel. Score
80 KERNEL32.DLL,FreeLibrary; 0.1035
57 ADVAPI32.DLL,RegCloseKey; 0.0972
578 ADVAPI32.DLL,RegOpenKeyExW; 0.0964
20 KERNEL32.DLL,lstrlenW; 0.0846
111 KERNEL32.DLL,GetCurrentThreadId; 0.0825
22 KERNEL32.DLL,Sleep; 0.0756
37 KERNEL32.DLL,LocalFree; 0.0756
102 KERNEL32.DLL,GetTickCount; 0.0673
36 KERNEL32.DLL,GetLastError; 0.0538
506 KERNEL32.DLL,SetEvent; 0.0532
The most important activity in malware is file management [9], which enables them
to create, or copy files (themselves or other files) multiple times to spread malware
distribution, control the targeted computers, and destroy the integrity of the system (e.g.,
CreateFileW in KERNEL32.DLL, DestroyIcon in USER32.DLL, CreatePopupMenu in
USER32.DLL, DestroyWindow in USER32.DLL, etc.). To achieve the malicious goals,
they also have their own methods to deal with process and registry, which heavily use
VirtualQuery in KERNEL32.DLL to get the virtual address space of the calling process
that is intent to hide from or affect. Compared with malware, benign files act normally
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in file, memory, process, and registry operations.
Based on the general statistical properties observed from the real sample collection,
intuitively, to evade the detection with lower adversarial cost, the attackers may manip-
ulate the API calls by the way of injecting the ones most relevant to benign files while
removing the ones with higher relevance scores to malware. To stimulate the attacks,
we rank each API call and group them into two sets: M (i.e., API calls highly relevant
to malware) and B (i.e., API calls highly relevant to benign files) in the descent order of
I(x,+1) and I(x,−1) respectively, whereM is utilized for elimination, while B is applied
for addition. It is worth noting that the observed sample files are either surrogate or
originally used by the target system depending on different attack scenarios.
Adversarial Attack Model
To implement the adversarial attack, we further define a function g(A(X)) to repre-
sent the capability of an attacker:
g(A(X)) = ||y − f ′||2, (4.8)
where f ′ = sign(f(A(X))), and g(A(X)) implies the number of malware misclassified
as benign files. The underlying idea is thus to manipulate a subset of features with
minimum adversarial cost while maximize the total loss of classification (as specified
in Equation 4.8). In principle, a brute-force method can be applied to select features
for manipulation. However, search by exhaustion is extremely expensive for the large-
dimensional feature set. To achieve the optimal attack, here we adopt the wrapper
method [152] which greedily selects features based on the capability of the attack. Dif-
ferent from the work in [152], we conduct bi-directional feature selection, that is, forward
feature addition performed on B and backward feature elimination performed onM. At
each iteration, an API call will be selected for addition or elimination depending on the
fact how it influences the value of g(A(X)). The adversarial attack θ = {θ+,θ−} will
be drawn from the iterations, where θ+ ∈ {0, 1}d (if APIi is selected for elimination,
then θ+i = 1; otherwise, θ
+
i = 0), and θ
− ∈ {0, 1}d (if APIi is selected for addition,
then θ−i = 1; otherwise, θ
−
i = 0). The iterations will terminate at the point where the
adversarial cost reaches to maximum (δmax) or the features available for addition and
elimination are all manipulated. The implementation of the proposed adversarial attack
(AdvAttack) is given in Algorithm 4.
The proposed AdvAttack enables the adversary to fully take advantage of the prop-
erty of the feature set, and get a better chance of evading the targeted classifier. M
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and B significantly decrease the number of searches, and thereby reduce the computa-
tional complexity. Given m = max(|M|, |B|), the proposed attack AdvAttack requires
O(ntm(µ
+ + µ−)) queries, in which nt is the number of testing malware samples, µ+
and µ− are the numbers of selected features for elimination and addition respectively.
Note that, this algorithm is applicable to the attackers of different skills and capabilities
resting on the feature space, the training data set, and the learning algorithm either
surrogate or originally used by the targeted system.
Algorithm 4: AdvAttack - A well-crafted adversarial attack model
for the attackers with different skills and capabilities
Input: Training set D = {xi, yi}ni=1, testing set Dt = {xi, yi}nti=1; af : cost of
changing feature f ; c+, c−: cost of eliminating and adding features in a
file; S+, S−: features selected; µ+, µ−: number of features selected for
elimination and addition.
Output: Adversarial attack θ = {θ+,θ−}.
Train a classifier f(X) using n training file samples;
S+ ← ∅, S− ← ∅, θ+i = 0, θ−j = 0, (i, j ∈ (0, 1, ..., d));
while (c+ + c− ≤ δmax) and (µ+ < d or µ− < d) do
X← X/S+, X← X⋃S−;
for each feature x+i ∈M do
Xx+ ← X/{x+i }: eliminate x+i from nt testing file samples;
Calculate g(Xx+);
end
for each feature x−j ∈ B do
Xx− ← X
⋃{x−j }: add x−j to nt testing file samples; Calculate g(Xx−);
end
xmax = argmax {g(Xx+), g(Xx−)};
if xmax ∈M and µ+ < d then
S+ ← S+⋃{x+i }
c+ = c+ + ax+i
, µ+ = µ+ + 1;
end
if xmax ∈ B and µ− < d then
S− ← S−⋃{x−j }
c− = c− + ax−j ,µ
− = µ− + 1;
end
end
Set θ+i = 1 for x
+
i ∈ S+, θ−j = 1 for x−j ∈ S−;
return θ = {θ+,θ−};
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4.3.3 Secure-learning Model based on AdvAttack
A defender usually reacts to the adversarial attacks by analyzing the attack and
retraining the classifier on the new collected file samples, or modifying features of the
training dataset to counter the adversary’s strategy [108]. However, retraining with ad-
versarial data typically suffers from a limitation: the retrained model modifies the train-
ing data distribution approximate to the testing space through the attack model. After
modifying a large number of features and malicious files, the model tends to produce a
distribution that is very close to that of the benign files. In this case, the retrained model
may not be able to differentiate benign and malicious files accurately. To this end, we
perform our security analysis of the learning-based classifier resting on the application
setting that the defender draws the well-crafted AdvAttack from the observed sample
space, since the attack is modeled as optimization under generic framework. Therefore,
in our proposed secure-learning model (SecDefender), we exploit the AdvAttack θ to
retrain the classifier in a progressive way and apply adversarial cost c to regularize the
optimization problem.
Classifier Retraining. Incorporating the adversarial attack θ into the learning
algorithm can enables us to provide a significant connection between training and the
adversarial action. Instead of manipulating the feature spaces for all the malicious train-
ing dataset, we start with the original training data X and iteratively computing a
classifier by injecting the adversarial samples tainted by θ into the training data that
evade the previously computed classifier [83]. The new dataset X′ can be formalized as
follows:
X′ = X
nm⋃
i=1
(xi + θ), (4.9)
s.t. f(xi + θ) < 0, (4.10)
where nm is the total number of malware samples added during the retraining iteration.
The iterations converge when there are no new adversarial samples generated through the
retrained classifier or the specified number of iterations reaches. Compared to updating
all the malicious training dataset, this progressive classifier retraining method effectively
increases the importance of malware in training process, and can therefore significantly
keep the detection system in a more accurate level.
Security Regularization. Resting on the retrained classifier, in our proposed
model, we further enhance the security of the classifier by using a security regularization
term over the adversarial cost. Our empirical studies demonstrate that even retrained
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by the updated training dataset, the classifiers are still degraded to some extent. It’s
recalled that an optimal adversarial attack aims to manipulate a subset of features with
minimum adversarial cost while maximize the total loss of classification. In contrast, to
secure the classifier in malware detection, we would like to maximize the adversarial cost
for the attacks [152]: from the analysis of the adversary problem [13, 78], we can find
that the larger the adversarial cost, the more manipulations need to be performed, and
the more difficult the attack is. If a larger number of features has to be manipulated
to evade detection, it may be infeasible to perform such attack. Therefore, to be more
resilient against the adversarial attack, an ideal secure-learning model is to maximize
the adversarial cost for the attackers. Accordingly, the adversary action of the learning
classifier can be defined as:
T (A(x),x) = 1C(A(x),x) , (4.11)
subject to Equation 4.3. If A(xi) = xi which represents that the file is not manipulated
by the adversary, T (A(xi),xi) = 0. We then define an adversary action matrix denoted
as T ∈ Rn×n, where the element Tij = T (A(xi),xj). Based on the adjacency adversary
action matrix T, and the idea drawn from the Laplacian matrix [5], the security matrix
can be defined as S = D − T, where D is the diagonal matrix with Dii =
∑
k Tik
while the remain elements are 0. Resting on the concept of label smoothness [138]
and assumption for the optimization learning [110] (i.e., data points tend to reserve the
initial labels over the classification), we can secure the classifier with the constraint as
1
2
∑n
i,j=1 Tij(f
′
i − yj)2 = 12 f ′TSy.
Since the learning-based malware detection can be formalized as an optimization
problem denoted by Equation 4.2, we can then bring a regularization term to enhance
its security. This constraint penalizes parameter choices, smooths the effects the attack
may cause, and in turn helps to promote the optimal solution for the local minima
in the optimization problem. Therefore, to minimize classifier sensitivity to feature
manipulation, we can minimize the security regularization term. Based on Equation 4.2,
we can formulate a secure-learning model against the adversarial attack as:
argmin
f ′,w,b;ξ
L(f ′,w,b; ξ) = argmin
f ′,w,b;ξ
1
2
||y − f ′||2 + α
2
f ′TSy+
1
2β
wTw +
1
2γ
bTb + ξT (f ′ −X′Tw − b). (4.12)
where α is the regularization parameter for the security constraint. As ∂L∂w = 0,
∂L
∂b = 0,
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∂L
∂ξ = 0,
∂L
∂f ′ = 0, we have
w = βX′ξ, (4.13)
h = γξ, (4.14)
f ′ = X′Tw + h, (4.15)
f ′ = y − α
2
Sy − ξ. (4.16)
Based on the derivation from Equation 4.13, Equation 4.14, and Equation 4.15, we have
ξ = (βX′TX′ + γI)−1f ′. (4.17)
We substitute Equation 4.17 to Equation 4.16, then we get the final secure-learning
problem as:
((βX′TX′ + γI) + I)f ′ = (I− α
2
S)(βX′TX′ + γI)y. (4.18)
Since the size of X′ is d× n, the computational complexity for Equation 4.18 is O(n3).
To solve the secure-learning problem (Equation 4.18), we use conjugate gradient descent
method and the implementation of SecDefender is shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: SecDefender - A secure-learning model against well-
crafted attack
Input: Training data set D = {xi, yi}ni=1 and testing set Dt = {xi, yi}nti=1;
Evasion attack θ.
Output: f ′: the labels of the input files.
Iteratively train classifier f(X
⋃
i(xi + θ)) to get X
′;
f ′0 = 0;
A = (βX′TX′ + γI) + I;
r0 = (I− α2S)(βX′TX′ + γI)y −Af ′0;
p0 = r0;
k = 0;
while ||rk|| > ε do
λk = (r
T
k rk)/(p
T
kApk);
f ′k+1 = f
′
k + λkpk;
rk+1 = rk − λkApk;
ζk = (r
T
k+1rk+1)/(r
T
k rk);
pk+1 = rk+1 + ζkpk;
k = k + 1;
end
return f ′k;
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4.3.4 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, to empirically validate the proposed secure-learning model SecDe-
fender, we present four sets of experiments: (1) In the first set of experiments, we
compare the attack model AdvAttack with other feature manipulation methods; (2) In
the second set of experiments, we evaluate the attack model AdvAttack under different
scenarios; (3) In the second set of experiments, we then evaluate the effectiveness of
our proposed secure-learning model SecDefender against the adversarial attack; (4) In
the last set of experiments, we compare the performance of SecDefender against the
adversarial attack with other widely used anti-malware products. We use the same
performance indices shown in Table 3.5.
Experimental Setup
The real sample collection obtained from Comodo Cloud Security Center contains
10, 000 file samples with 3, 503 extracted API calls, where 5, 000 are malware, 5, 000 are
benign files. In our experiments, we randomly select 90% of the samples for training,
while the remaining 10% is used for testing. Since not all of the API calls will contribute
to the classification as analyzed in Section 4.3.2, those API calls whose relevance scores
are lower than the empirical threshold (i.e., 0.0005 in our application) will be excluded
for feature manipulations. Therefore, |M| = 810, |B| = 1, 183, and all the file samples
can be represented as binary feature vectors with 1, 993-dimensions. For simplicity, we
assume ci = 1 for each feature to conduct our experiments.
Figure 4.5: The feature distribution of file samples.
According to the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the number of API
calls the file samples include shown in Figure 4.5, we exploit the average number of
API calls that each file possesses, which is 109, to define the maximum manipulation
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cost δmax. We run our evaluation of the proposed adversarial attacks with δmax varies
in {5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 50%} of 109, which is {5, 11, 16, 22, 55}. We also use the
performance measures shown in Table 3.5 to quantitatively validate the effectiveness of
the proposed methods.
Comparisons of AdvAttack and Other Attacks
We first compare our proposed adversarial attack AdvAttack with other attack meth-
ods using different feature manipulation approaches including: (1) only manipulating
API calls from B for addition; (2) only manipulating API calls from M for elimination;
(3) sequentially selecting (1/2 × δmax) API calls from B for addition and (1/2 × δmax)
API calls from M for elimination; (4) simulating anonymous attack by randomly ma-
nipulating API calls for addition and elimination.
(a) FNR with different δmax (b) FNR with δmax = 22 (c) F1 measures with δmax = 22
Figure 4.6: Comparisons of AdvAttack and other adversarial attacks: Original-Classifier
(0), different adversarial attacks (Method 1 - 4) and AdvAttack (5)
The experimental results are shown in Figure 4.6. Note that, Since we just manip-
ulate the features on the testing malicious files (i.e., benign files remain unchanged), all
FPs and TN s after attacks in the experiments keep the same as before attack (i.e., FP
is 21, and TN is 423). The experimental results illustrate that the attack performances
vary when using different feature manipulation methods with certain adversarial costs
δmax: (1) the manipulation of only feature elimination performs worst with FNR; (2) the
manipulation which sequentially selecting features for addition and elimination performs
better than the methods only using feature addition or elimination, and the anonymous
attack, due to its bi-directional feature manipulation over B and M; (3) AdvAttack can
greatly improve the FNR to 0.6978 while degrade the detection F1 measure of the clas-
sifier to 0.4384, when δmax = 22; the attackers can achieve ideal attack using AdvAttack
(i.e., FNR almost reaches to 1, which means almost malware samples are misclassified),
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when δmax = 55. Due to its well-crafted attack strategy, AdvAttack outperforms other
adversarial attack methods with different feature manipulation approaches.
Evaluations of AdvAttack under Different Scenarios
We further implement and evaluate our proposed attack AdvAttack under different
scenarios described in Section 4.2: (1) In mimicry (MMC) attack (Ψ = (X, Dˆ)), the
attackers are assumed to know the feature space and be able to obtain a file collection to
imitate the original training dataset. In our experiment, we randomly select 1, 000 file
samples (500 benign and 500 malicious) from the 9, 000 training set as our mimic dataset
and exploit commonly used linear SVM as the surrogate classifier to train these 1, 000
mimic file samples. (2) In imperfect-knowledge (IPK) attack (Ψ = (X,D)), we assume
that both the feature space and the original training sample set can be fully controlled by
the attackers. Therefore, we perform the IPK attack conformably as MMC attack where
the only difference is that we apply 9, 000 samples to train SVM. (3) In Ideal-knowledge
(IDK) attack (Ψ = (X,D, f)), the attackers can perfectly access to the classifier system.
The previous experiments of AdvAttack are conducted based on such assumption. To be
comparable, AdvAttack is applied to all these scenarios resting on the same cost settings.
Figure 4.7: FNR before and after each attack under different scenarios for all 1,000
testing file samples
The experimental results are shown in Figure 4.7, in which red bar denotes the
FNR of the classifier before attack (NonAtt) and different attacks with the adversarial
cost δmax = 22. The FNR values float up or down depending on the adversarial cost.
The experimental results demonstrate that the available knowledge for the attackers
significantly contributes to the performance of the attack. With perfect knowledge, the
IDK attack can well evade the detection (e.g., 69.78% of the testing malware samples
are misclassified as benign when δmax = 22). Our proposed attack AdvAttack can be
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applied as a representative attack model with general attack characteristics.
Evaluation of SecDefender against Adversarial Attacks
In response to well-crafted attacks, we’d like to assess the effectiveness of our pro-
posed secure-learning model SecDefender based on AdvAttack. We use AdvAttack to
taint the malware in the testing sample set, and validate the classification performance
in different ways: (1) the Original-Classifier before attack (NonAtt); (2) the classifier
under attack (UnderAtt); (3) the classifier retrained using the updated training dataset
(i.e., x+θ) (Retrained); (4) our secure-learning model SecDefender. The comparisons of
the effectiveness of these classifiers are shown in Figure 4.8(a) (accuracy values against
attacks with different adversarial costs) and Figure 4.8(b),(c) (FNR, F1, and ROC curves
for the classifiers against the attack with δmax = 22).
(a) ACC with different δmax (b) FNR and F1 with δmax = 22 (c) ROC curves
Figure 4.8: Comparisons of SecDefender and other classification models on ACC, F1,
FNR, and ROC curves: Original-Classifier (1), Original-Classifier under attack (2),
retrained Original-Classifier (3), and SecDefender (4)
It can be observed that the retrained classifier ideally applying the adversarial attack
θ to transform the malware in the training dataset from x to x + θ can somehow be
resilient to the attacks, but the accuracy still remain unsatisfied. In contrast, SecDe-
fender with progressive retraining technique, can well improve the TPR and accuracy,
and bring the malware detection system back up to the desired performance level, the
detection F1 measure of which is 0.9561 (δmax = 22), approaching the detection results
before the attack (i.e., 0.9613).
It may also be interesting to know how robust that our learning systems can combat
the anonymous attacks. We conduct the anonymous attack by randomly selecting the
features for addition or elimination as described in Experiment 4.3.4, which does not
exploit any knowledge of the target system. Under the anonymous attack, SecDefender
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has zero knowledge of what the attack is. Even in such case, SecDefender still improves
the detection F1 measure from 0.7304 to 0.8830. Based on these properties, SecDefender
can be a resilient solution in malware detection against well-crafted attacks even the
attackers have perfect knowledge of the learning system.
Comparisons with Different Anti-malware Scanners
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the performance of SecDefender against the
adversarial attack in comparison with some other popular commercial anti-malware scan-
ners such as Kaspersky (K), McAfee (M), Symantec (S), and TrendMicro (T). For the
comparisons, we use all the latest versions of the security products. We use 556 mal-
ware samples from the testing dataset described in Section 4.3.4 for evaluation. The
testing malware are first tainted by AdvAttack, and then scanned by these anti-malware
products. The detection results are illustrated in Table 4.2. Compared with these typi-
cal anti-malware scanners, SecDefender can effectively sustain the TPR to 0.9335, and
performs the best accurate detection.
Table 4.2: Comparisons of different anti-malware scanners
Malware K M S T SecDefender
1 × √ × × √
2
√ × √ × ×
3 × × × × √
4 × √ × × √
5 × × × × √
6 × × × √ √
7 × × × × √
8 × × × × ×
9
√ × √ × √
10
√ × × × √
...
...
...
...
...
...
556 × √ √ √ √
TP 508 503 511 498 519
TPR 0.9136 0.9046 0.9190 0.8957 0.9335
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4.4 SecureDroid : A Secure-learning Paradigm against
Various Kinds of Attacks
Though SecDefender is promising, it makes strong assumptions about the structure
of the data (e.g., adversarial samples) and the attack model that are likely impractical
for malware detection problems. The effectiveness for these methods depends on the
adversarial attacks similar to the one used by the adversary, which is non-adaptive to
the unknown attacks. In this section, we aim to enhance security of machine learning-
based malware detection against various kinds of adversarial attacks, whose action space
is practically independent from the skills and capabilities of the attackers.
According to Lemma 4.1, in the adversarial point of view, to conduct a practical
attack, attackers intend to find the features which are easy to be manipulated (i.e., fea-
tures with low costs being manipulated) and minimize the manipulations (i.e., modify
the features as less as possible) to bypass the detection. For example, to evade the de-
tection, attackers may manipulate the spy Trojan “Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot” by injecting
the Windows API calls of “KERNEL32.DLL,FreeLibrary;” which is frequently used in
benign files instead of removing suspicious API call of “MAPI32.MAPIReadMail”, since
feature addition is usually cost-effective and safer than feature elimination to bypass the
detection while preserves the semantics and intrusive functionality of the original ma-
licious file. In contrast, to be resilient against the adversarial attacks, an ideal defense
should make the attackers cost-expensive and maximize their manipulations to evade the
detection.
In this section, resting on the analysis of a set of features (i.e., permissions, filtered
intents, API calls, and new-instances) extracted from the Android app files, we take
a further step to explore the security of machine learning in malware detection. To
make the classifier harder to be evaded, we first present a novel feature selection method
(named SecCLS ) to build the classifier, by taking consideration of different importances
of the features associated with their contributions to the classification problem as well
as their manipulation costs. To improve the system security while not compromising
the detection accuracy, we further propose an ensemble learning approach (named Se-
cENS ) by aggregating the individual classifiers that are constructed using the proposed
feature selection method SecCLS. Accordingly, we develop a system called SecureDroid
which integrates both SecCLS and SecENS to secure machine learning-based malware
detection. The system architecture of SecureDroid is shown in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: An overview of system architecture of SecureDroid. In the system, the
collected app files are first represented as d-dimensional binary feature vectors. Then
SecCLS is applied to select a set of features (each feature i is selected with probabil-
ity P(i)) to construct a more secure classifier. SecENS is later exploited to aggregate
different individual classifiers built using SecCLS to classify malicious and benign files.
For a new file, based on the extracted features, it will be predicted as either malicious
or benign based on the trained classification model.
4.4.1 Feature Representation
Since we use Android apps as a case study to investigate the secure-learning paradigm
SecureDroid, we would like to introduce feature representations of Android apps with
preliminaries. Unlike traditional PE file, Android app is compiled and packaged in a
single archive file (with an .apk suffix) that contains the manifest file, Dalvid executable
(dex) file, resources, and assets.
Manifest file. Android defines a component-based framework for developing mobile
apps, which is composed of four different types of components [67]: Activities provide
Graphical User Interface (GUI) functionality to enable user interactivity; Services are
background communication processes that pass messages between the components of the
app and communicate with other apps; Broadcast Receivers are background processes
that respond to system-wide broadcast messages as necessary; and Content Providers
act as database management systems that manage the app data. Android app must
declare its components in the manifest file which retains information about its structure.
Before the Android system can start an app component, the system must know that the
component exists by reading the app’s manifest file. The manifest file actually works as
a road map to ensure that each app can function properly in the Android system. The
actions of each component are further specified through filtered intents which declare
the types of intents that an activity, service, or broadcast receiver can respond to [3].
For example, through filtered intents, an activity can initiate a phone call or a broadcast
receiver can monitor SMS message. The manifest file also contains a list of permissions
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requested by the app to perform functions (e.g., access Internet). Since permissions and
filtered intents can reflect the interaction between an app and other apps or operation
system, we extract them from manifest file as features to represent Android apps.
Dalvid executable (dex). Android apps are usually developed with Java. Devel-
opment environments (e.g., Eclipse) convert the Java source codes into Dalvik executable
(dex) files which can be run on the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DalvikVM)1 in Android.
Dex is a file format that contains compiled code written for Android and can be inter-
preted by the DalvikVM, which includes all the user-implemented methods and classes.
Dex file always contains API calls that are used by the Android apps in order to access
operating system functionality and resources, and new-instances which can be used to
create new instances of classes from operating system classes. Therefore, both API calls
and new-instances in the dex file can be used to represent the behaviors of an Android
app. To extract them from a dex file, since dex file is unreadable, we (1) first use the
reverse engineering tool APKTool2 to decompile the dex file into smali code (i.e., the
intermediate but interpreted code between Java and DalvikVM); and (2) then parse the
converted smali code to extract these two kinds of features.
We refer the readers to Section 4.3 for a statement on why we perform static analysis
and what the scope of our work is. The above Android apps and their features are
exploited as a case study which facilitate the understanding of our further proposed
approach, while other types of files and feature extractions are also applicable in our
further investigation.
Similar to the feature representation in Section 4.3.1, to represent each collected
Android app, we first extract the features and convert them into a vector space, which
can be fed to the classifier either for training or testing. For the collected apps, we extract
four sets of features (S1 – S4 ) to represent them (shown in Table 4.3): permissions (S1 )
and filtered intents (S2 ) from manifest files, API calls (S3 ) and new-instances (S4 ) from
dex files.
Resting on the above extracted features, we denote our dataset D to be of the form
D = {xi, yi}ni=1 of n apps, where xi is the features extracted from app i, and yi is the
class label of app i (yi ∈ {+1,−1, 0}, +1: malicious, −1: benign, and 0: unknown). Let
d be the number of all extracted features in S1 – S4 in dataset D. Each app can then
1https://source.android.com/devices/tech/dalvik/.
2http://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
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Table 4.3: Illustration of extracted features for Android apps in SecureDroid
Features Examples
Manifest
S1: Permissions
READ PHONE STATE
INTERNET
S2: Filtered Intents
intent.action.MAIN
vending.INSALL REFERER
Dex
S3: API calls
getSimSerialNumber
containsHeader
S4: New-Instances
Ljave/util/HashMap
Landroid/app/ProgressDialog
be represented by a binary feature vector:
xi =

0
. . .
1
1
. . .
0
1
. . .
0
1
. . .
1

→
READ PHONE STATE
. . .
INTERNET
S1: Permissions
intent.action.MAIN
. . .
vending.INSALL REFERER
S2: Filtered Intents
getSimSerialNumber
. . .
containsHeader
S3: API calls
Ljave/util/HashMap
. . .
Landroid/app/ProgressDialog
S4: New-Instances
where xi ∈ Rd, and xij = {0, 1} (i.e., if app i includes feature j, then xij = 1; otherwise,
xij = 0).
4.4.2 Secure Classifier Construction using Novel feature Selection
In adversarial settings, the importance of a feature from an attacker’s perspective is:
(i) its contribution to the classification problem, which is corresponding to the weight
w trained by the classifier based on the training data, and (ii) its complexity being
manipulated, that is, the manipulation cost c decided by feature type (e.g., permission
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vs. API call) and manipulation method (e.g., addition vs. elimination). Given ith-
feature (1 ≤ i ≤ d) extracted from the dataset D, its importance can be defined as
follow:
I(i) ∝ |wi|
ci
, (4.19)
which implies that the larger the weight of the feature trained by the classifier and the
lower the cost of the feature being manipulated, the more important the feature to the
attackers. Clearly, the importance of a feature represents the possibility that an attacker
may manipulate it in an adversarial attack.
The rationale to construct a more secure classifier against the adversarial attacks is to
reduce the possibility of those important features being selected for model construction.
In other words, those features the attackers tend to manipulate (i.e., features with higher
values of I(i)) may not present together in the learning model, which will intuitively force
attackers to manipulate a larger number of other less important features (i.e., features
with lower values of I(i)) to evade the detection. In this way, the probability of each
feature being selected for constructing a classification model is inversely proportional to
its importance, that is, the more important the feature is to attackers, the less possible
it will be selected to train the classifier. We formalize P(i), the probability of ith-feature
being selected, as:
P(i) ∝ λI(i) , (4.20)
where λ is an adjustable parameter which can be empirically decided based on the
training data. When substituting Eq. (4.19) into Eq. (4.20), the length of the probability
is actually arbitrary long (e.g., |wi| = 0). To normalize P(i), we further define P(i) as:
P(i) = λci(1− ρ|wi|), (4.21)
where ρ (0 < ρ < 1) is a rescaling parameter to keep P(i) in the range of (0, 1].
For the weight wi of ith-feature, it can be calculated by the learning-based classifier
in Eq. (4.2) trained on the dataset D. Provided that Eq. (4.2) is an optimization prob-
lem, based on the derivation and substitution, the weight vector for all features can be
calculated as:
w = βXξ, (4.22)
s.t. ξ = (βXTX + γI)−1f , (4.23)
where f can be solved through Eq. (4.2) using conjugate gradient descent method. We
then further normalize each weight |wi| using min-max normalization [59] to the range
of [0, 1].
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For the manipulation cost ci of ith-feature, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, it can be
estimated with respect to its feature type and the manipulation method. Considering
that (1) feature addition is usually easier than elimination, and (2) compared with per-
missions and filtered intents in the manifest file, API calls and new-instances in dex file
are relatively easier to be manipulated, Figure 4.10 illustrates different costs empirically
decided for manipulating different kinds of features in our application.
Figure 4.10: The manipulation costs determined by different feature types and manipu-
lation methods.
Attacker may know completely, partially, or do not have any information of the
targeted learning system about: (i) the feature space, (ii) the training data set, and (iii)
the learning algorithm [126]. We would like to overestimate attackers’ capabilities rather
than underestimate them. Since this worst case provides a potential upper bound on the
performance degradation suffered by the learning system under the adversarial attacks,
it can be used as reference to evaluate the effectiveness of the learning system under the
other limited attack scenarios. To conduct a well-crafted attack, we assume that attackers
are capable to access the targeted learning system and may have perfect knowledge
regarding the system. Therefore, they can use the methods such as information gain [59]
or max-relevance [103] to calculate the information of each feature for the classification
of malicious and benign apps respectively. Then they will be able to utilize those features
that significantly contribute to benign apps classification for additions, and apply those
ones that significantly contribute to malicious apps classification for eliminations.
As the above presentation, we can see that P(i) ∈ (0, 1], where the minimum is
attained when the feature is most informative for the classification task or easy to be
manipulated, and the maximum is attained when the feature has least contribution to the
classification problem or is too costly to be manipulated. We then form the probability
Chapter 4. Enhancing Security of Learning-based Systems in Malware Detection 79
set for selecting features to construct a more secure classifier as:
P = {P(1),P(2), ...,P(d)}. (4.24)
Given a pseudo random function R(.) ∈ (0, 1), the original feature vector of a given
app xi will be represented by an updated binary feature vector x¯i:
x¯i =< x¯i1, x¯i2, x¯i3, ..., x¯id >,
where
x¯ij =
xij R(.) ≤ P(j)0 otherwise . (4.25)
The proposed feature selection method for classifier construction is named SecCLS,
whose implementation is given in Algorithm 6. Note that when P(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ d) is with
the same value for each feature, i.e., feature importances are evenly distributed, our
proposed feature selection method SecCLS is approximate to random selection. Thus
we can say, random feature selection method [63, 16] is a lower bound of SecCLS. Our
proposed feature selection method SecCLS reduces the possibility of those features that
attackers tend to manipulate, which will accordingly force attackers to manipulate a
larger number of other features and thus be more resilient against their attacks. For
computational complexity of SecCLS, to get weight vector w from Eq. (4.2) requires
O(d3) queries, while to form cost vector c and calculate P both need O(d). Since we
formalize n apps as X, each column of which is the d-dimensional feature vector, to get
an updated training set X¯ from X requires O(nd) updates.
By using SecCLS, after feature selection, the learning-based classifier in Eq. (4.2)
can be updated as:
argmin
f¯ ,w,b;ξ
1
2
||y − f¯ ||2 + 1
2β
wTw +
1
2γ
bTb + ξT (f¯ − X¯Tw − b), (4.26)
subject to f¯ = sign(f(X¯)), where f¯ is the predicted label vector based on a feature set
X¯. To solve the problem in Eq. (4.26), let
L(f¯ ,w,b; ξ) = 1
2
||y − f¯ ||2 + 1
2β
wTw +
1
2γ
bTb + ξT (f¯ − X¯Tw − b). (4.27)
Based on the substitution and derivation from ∂L∂w = 0,
∂L
∂b = 0,
∂L
∂ξ = 0,
∂L
∂ f¯
= 0, we can
get the more secure classifier as:
[I + (βX¯T X¯ + γI)−1]f¯ = y. (4.28)
Chapter 4. Enhancing Security of Learning-based Systems in Malware Detection 80
Algorithm 6: SecCLS – A novel feature selection method to con-
struct more secure classifier.
Input: Training data set D = {xi, yi}ni=1.
Output: X¯: updated training set based on the selected features.
Get weight vector w by the learning-based classifier in Eq. (4.2) trained on D;
Get manipulation cost vector c;
Calculate P = {P(1),P(2), ...,P(d)} using Eq. (4.21);
k = 1;
for k ≤ d do
Get a pseudo random number from R(.);
if R(.) ≤ P(k) then
X¯k. = Xk.
else
X¯k. = 0
end
k + +;
end
return X¯;
4.4.3 Ensemble Learning to Improve Detection Accuracy
In the previous section, a novel feature selection method SecCLS is presented for
constructing a more secure classifier against the adversarial attacks. To improve the
system security while not compromising the detection accuracy, in this section, we further
propose an ensemble learning approach called SecENS to aggregate a set of classifiers
built using SecCLS to generate the final output for the detection.
Ensemble methods are a popular way to overcome instability and increase perfor-
mance in many machine learning tasks [147], such as classification, clustering and rank-
ing. An ensemble of classifiers is a set of classifiers whose individual decisions are com-
bined in some way (e.g., by weighted or unweighted voting) to classify new samples,
which is shown to be much more accurate than the individual classifiers that make them
up [141]. Typically, an ensemble can be decomposed into two cascaded components: the
first component is to create base classifiers with necessary accuracy and diversity; the
second one is to aggregate all of the outputs of base classifiers into a numeric value as the
final output of the ensemble. In general, base classifiers are generated by subsampling
training set or input features (as done in boosting or bagging), manipulating the output
targets, or injecting randomness in the learning algorithm [43].
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In this paper, with certain accuracy of each individual classifier, we aim to diversify
the classifiers that form the ensemble while also consider the integration of whole feature
space. More specifically, the set of classifiers in the ensemble should follow two criteria:
(1) the feature set used for building each classifier should differentiate from each other
(i.e., feature differentiation), and (2) the ensemble should cover as many features as pos-
sible to assure the integration of whole feature space (i.e., feature integration). Therefore,
Algorithm 7: SecENS – An ensemble learning approach to improve
the detection accuracy.
Input: Training data set D = {xi, yi}ni=1; W: weights of training files; ε: error rate for
each classifier; ζ: importance of each classifier; ηd: specified threshold of fD; ηf :
specified threshold of fI ; ηa: specified threshold of training accuracy.
Output: f : the labels for the files.
Initialize: W1(i) = 1n for i = 1, 2, ..., n; t = 0;
Get training set X¯1 and selected feature set F1 on D using SecCLS ;
while 1 do
t+ +;
Train a base classifier using X¯t;
Get weak hypothesis ft: X¯
t → {−1, 1};
Calculate error rate of ft:
εt ←∑ni=1Wt(i)[yi 6= ft(x¯ti)];
Set ζt =
1
2
ln( 1−εt
εt
) ;
Update Wt+1(i) = Wt(i) exp(−ζty¯ift(x¯i))∑n
i=1Wt(i) exp(−ζty¯ift(x¯i))
for i = 1, 2, ..., n;
Calculate fI(F);
Calculate the training accuracy (acc) of the ensemble based on
f = sign(
∑t
i=1 ζifi(X));
if fI(F) ≥ ηf and acc ≥ ηa then
break;
end
Get X¯t+1 and Ft+1 on D using SecCLS ;
Calculate fD(F
t+1,Fj) for j = 1, 2, ..., t;
while min{fD(Ft+1,Fj) | j = 1, 2, ..., t} < ηd do
Get X¯t+1 and Ft+1 on D using SecCLS ;
Calculate fD(F
t+1,Fj) for j = 1, 2, ..., t;
end
end
return f = sign(
∑t
i=1 ζifi(X));
we first construct each individual classifier using the proposed feature selection method
SecCLS described in Section 4.4.2; then we follow the above two criteria and propose
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SecENS to aggregate a set of the constructed classifiers to generate the final output for
the detection. We present SecENS with the definitions of the above two criteria.
Feature Differentiation (denoted as fD). Given two feature sets F
a ∈ Rd and
Fb ∈ Rd, which are selected using the proposed method SecCLS respectively, the differ-
entiation between them can be defined as:
fD(F
a,Fb) = 1− J(Fa,Fb) = |F
a ∪ Fb| − |Fa ∩ Fb|
|Fa ∪ Fb| . (4.29)
Feature Integration (denoted as fI). The feature integration of an ensemble is the
percentage of features that are included in at least one of the base classifiers, which can
be defined as follow:
fI(F) =
|⋃Kk=1 Fk|
d
, (4.30)
where the feature set F ∈ Rd in the ensemble is aggregated by the feature sets Fk
(k = 1, 2, ...,K) from base classifiers.
In SecENS, we employ boosting [43] during the training phase. Boosting works by
sequentially applying a base classifier to train the updated weighted samples and aggre-
gating all the outputs generated from the individual classifiers into the final prediction.
At each iteration, the misclassified samples are assigned higher weights, so that at the
next iteration, the classifier will focus more on learning those samples [57]. With the use
of boosting, our proposed ensemble learning approach SecENS builds the ensemble by
integrating both feature differentiation (fD) and feature integration (fI) to diversify the
classifiers while preserve a significant integration of whole feature space. Algorithm 7
illustrates the implementation of the proposed SecENS in detail.
4.4.4 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, to empirically validate our developed system SecureDroid, we present
four sets of experimental studies using real sample collections obtained from Comodo
Cloud Security Center: (1) In the first set of experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness
of SecureDroid against different kinds of adversarial attacks; (2) In the second set of
experiments, we assess the security of our proposed feature selection method SecCLS ap-
plied in the system SecureDroid ; (3) In the third set of experiments, we further compare
SecureDroid with other alternative defense methods; (4) In the last set of experiments,
we evaluate the scalability of SecureDroid based on a larger sample collection.
Experimental Setup
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Data collection The real sample collections we obtained from Comodo Cloud Security
Center contain two sets: (1) The first sample set includes 8, 046 apps (4, 729 are benign
apps, while the remaining 3, 317 apps are malware including the families of Geinimi,
GinMaster, DriodKungfu, Hongtoutou, FakePlayer, etc.). The extracted features from
this sample set is with 926 dimensions, which include 104 permissions, 204 filtered intents,
330 API calls, and 288 new-instances. (2) The second dataset has larger sample collection
containing 72, 891 Android apps (40, 448 benign apps and 32, 443 malicious apps).
Evaluation Measures To quantitatively validate the effectiveness of different meth-
ods in Android malware detection, we use the performance indices shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Performance indices of Android malware detection
Indices Description
TP Number of apps correctly classified as malicious
TN Number of apps correctly classified as benign
FP Number of apps mistakenly classified as malicious
FN Number of apps mistakenly classified as benign
Precision TP/(TP + FP)
Recall/TPR TP/(TP + FN)
ACC (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN)
F1 2× Precision× Recall/(Precision + Recall)
Implementation of different adversarial attacks To thoroughly assess the security
and detection accuracy of our developed system SecureDroid against a wide class of
attacks, we define and implement three kinds of representative adversarial attacks [87,
152, 83] considering different skills and capabilities of attackers, which are presented as
followings.
Brute-force (BF) attack. To implement such kind of attack, for each malicious app
(i.e., x+) we would like to manipulate, we first use Jaccard similarity [59] to find its most
similar benign app (i.e., x−) from the sample set. Given these two apps, the procedure
begins with x+ and modifies features one at a time to match those of x−, until the
malicious app is classified as benign or the adversarial cost reaches to δmax.
Anonymous (AN) attack. To simulate anonymous attack in which the defenders may
have zero knowledge of what the attack is, we randomly manipulate some features for
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addition and some for elimination with the adversarial cost of δmax.
Well-crafted (WC) attack. In this adversarial setting, we use the wrapper-based
approach [152, 83] to iteratively select a feature and greedily update this feature to
incrementally increase the classification errors of the targeted learning system. Specifi-
cally, we first rank the features using methods such as information gain [59] to calculate
their contributions to the classification problem. Then we conduct bi-directional feature
selection, i.e., forward feature addition and backward feature elimination, to manipulate
the malicious apps. At each iteration, using the attack model formulated in Eq. 4.5 (in
Section 4.2.3) which encodes two competing objectives (i.e., maximizing the classifica-
tion error while minimizing the adversarial cost for optimal attacks), a feature will be
either added or eliminated.
(a) Manipulated features No. vs. δmax (b) Manipulated features No. (under 50% TPR)
Figure 4.11: Effectiveness evaluation of different attacks.
To estimate the effectiveness of different attacks, we implement the above three kinds
of attacks to access the Original-Classifier described in Section 4.1 and make its TPRs
drop from 90% to 50%. For each attack, Figure 4.11(a) shows the relations between
the numbers of manipulated features and the corresponding adversarial costs which also
consider the complexity of different feature manipulations. Among these attacks, the
WC attack is the most effective strategy, since the adversarial cost of this attack (also
the number of features manipulated by this attack) is minimum when compromising the
learning classifier into the same level, which can be seen in Figure 4.11(b).
Evaluation of SecureDroid against Different Adversarial Attacks
In this set of experiments, based on the first sample set described in Section 4.4.4, we
validate the effectiveness of SecureDroid against above mentioned adversarial attacks.
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To estimate the reasonable adversarial cost for attackers to perform the adversarial at-
tacks, based on the first sample set, we explore the average number of features that
each app possesses, which is 98. In general, 50% of the average number of features is
considered as an extreme for the adversary to perform the attack. Based on these obser-
vations, we implement the above three kinds of attacks to access both SecureDroid and
Original-Classifier with the manipulated features varying in {10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%}
of the average number of features (i.e., 98), whose corresponding adversarial costs un-
der different kinds of attacks are shown in Figure 4.12.(a)–(c) (X-axis). We randomly
select 90% of the samples for training, while the remaining 10% is used for testing. We
use these attacks to taint the malicious apps in the testing set respectively, and then
assess the security of SecureDroid under different attacks with different adversarial costs
by comparison with the Original-Classifier. To implement SecureDroid, empirically we
found that the parameters of λ = 0.7 and ρ = 0.8 in Eq. 4.21 are the best, and apply
them to our problem throughout the experiments. To validate the detection performance
of SecureDroid without attacks, we also perform 10-fold cross validations for evaluation.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 4.12.
Under attacks. From Figure 4.12(a)–(c), we can see that SecureDroid can signifi-
cantly enhance security compared to the Original-Classifier, as its performance decreases
more elegantly against increasing adversarial costs, especially in the scenarios of BF at-
tack and WC attack. In the BF attack, the TPR of Original-Classifier drops to 5.99%
with adversarial cost δmax of 23.4 (i.e., modifying 50 features), while SecureDroid retains
the TPR at 70.06% with the same adversarial cost. In the WC attack, the performance
of Original-Classifier is compromised to a great extent with TPR of 13.62% under the
adversarial cost of 25.2; instead, SecureDroid can significantly bring the detection sys-
tem back up to the desired performance level: the TPRs of SecureDroid are actually
never lower than 80.00% even with increasing adversarial costs. This demonstrates that
SecureDroid which integrates our proposed methods is resilient against the most effective
attack strategy (i.e., WC attack) among the three representative adversarial attacks. In
the AN attack, which is simulated under defenders have zero knowledge of what the
attack is and by randomly injecting or removing features from the malicious apps, Se-
cureDroid also outperforms the Original-Classifier, which can retain the average TPR
at 85.16% with different adversarial costs.
Without attacks. Figure 4.12(d) shows the ROC curves of the 10-fold cross valida-
tions for Original-Classifier and SecureDroid without any attacks. From Figure 4.12(d),
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we can see that, though SecureDroid is designed to be resilient against different kinds
of adversarial attacks, its detection performance is as good as the Original-Classifier in
the absence of attacks.
The experimental results and above analysis demonstrate that SecureDroid can effec-
tively enhance security of the learning-based classifier without compromising the detec-
tion accuracy, even attackers may have different knowledge about the targeted learning
system. Based on these properties, SecureDroid can be a resilient solution in Andriod
malware detection.
(a) Under brute-force (BF) attacks (b) Under anonymous (AN) attacks
(c) Under well-crafted (WC) attacks (d) ROC curves without attacks
Figure 4.12: Security evaluations under brute-force (BF) attacks, anonymous (AN) at-
tacks, well-crafted (WC) attacks, and without attacks.
Evaluation of SecCLS Applied in SecureDroid
In this section, based on the same training and testing datasets in the previous
section, we further validate the effectiveness and significance of our proposed feature
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selection method SecCLS in building a more secure classifier. We compare SecureDroid
which applies SecCLS to select features for each base classifier with ensemble of random
feature selection (denoted as ERFS ) that uses random feature selection method to con-
struct base classifiers [16, 63], in the settings of under attacks and without attacks. As
illustrated in Section 4.4.4, since well-crafted (WC) attack is the most effective attack
strategy among those three, we evaluate the SecureDroid and ERFS under such kind of
attacks. The experimental results are shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Comparison of SecureDroid with SecCLS and ERFS with random feature
selection against well-crafted attacks (UnderAtt) and without attacks (NonAtt).
NonAtt
UnderAtt [δmax (features modified)]
4.8(10) 9.0(20) 13.5(30) 19.2(40) 25.2(50)
ERFS
TPR 0.9072 0.8563 0.5045 0.4326 0.2934 0.1647
ACC 0.9230 0.9354 0.7888 0.7559 0.6981 0.6509
F1 0.9072 0.9167 0.6647 0.5953 0.4465 0.2813
SecureDroid
TPR 0.9566 0.9177 0.8323 0.8563 0.8308 0.8069
ACC 0.9634 0.9168 0.8665 0.8621 0.8019 0.8106
F1 0.9559 0.9015 0.8380 0.8375 0.7768 0.7795
From Table 4.5, we can observe that, (1) Under attacks: ERFS can somehow be
resilient against the attack (with TPR of 85.63%) when the adversarial cost is small
(δmax = 4.8, modifying 10 features). However, with the increasing adversarial costs, the
detection performance of ERFS drops drastically (e.g., its TPR drops to 16.47% when
the adversarial cost δmax is 25.2 corresponding to manipulating 50 features). In contrast,
SecureDroid using SecCLS for feature selection can significantly enhance security, as
its performance decreases more elegantly against increasing adversarial costs and its
TPRs are actually never lower than 80.00% with different adversarial costs. The reason
behind this is that SecCLS integrated in SecureDroid reduces the possibility of selecting
those features attackers tend to manipulate, i.e., to achieve same attack utility, SecCLS
will force attackers to modify larger number of features compared with random feature
selection method. (2) Without attacks: SecureDroid also performs better than ERFS
in the absence of attacks (i.e., about 4-5% higher detection accuracy). This is because,
compared with ERFS which randomly assigns equal probability for each feature being
selected, SecureDroid applying SecCLS is capable to retain majority of the features for
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each individual classifier and thus assure its detection accuracy without attacks.
Comparisons of SecureDroid with Other Defense Methods
In this set of experiments, we further examine the effectiveness of SecureDroid against
the adversarial attacks (i.e., well-crafted attack as it shows most effective) by compar-
isons with other popular defense methods, including (1) feature evenness (denoted
as Defense1 ) which enables the Original-Classifier to learn more evenly-distributed
feature weights using the method proposed in [78]; (2) classifier retraining (denoted
as Defense2 ) which follows Stackelberg game theories [19, 58, 18, 127] and models the
attack as a vector θ to modify the training data set X where the Original-Classifier is re-
trained [127, 133]; (3) classifier built on reduced feature set (denoted as Defense3 )
which carefully selects a subset of features based on the generalization capability of the
Original-Classifier and its security against data manipulation applying the method pro-
posed in [152]. The experimental results are reported in Figure 4.13.
(a) TPRs under attacks (b) F1 measures under attacks
Figure 4.13: Comparisons of different defense methods.
From Figure 4.13, we can see that SecureDroid significantly outperforms the other
defense models (i.e., Defense1–3 ) against the well-crafted attacks. Although Defense2
(i.e., classifier retraining) performs slightly better than SecureDroid when the adversarial
costs δmax ∈ {4.8, 9.0} (i.e., modifying 10 and 20 features), the difference is not statis-
tically significant. In fact, the retrained model modifies the training data distribution
approximate to the testing space through the attack model θ. After modifying a large
number of features in the malicious apps, the model tends to produce a distribution
that is very close to that of the benign apps. In this case, the retrained model may
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not be able to differentiate benign and malicious apps accurately. From Figure 4.13, we
also observe that as the adversarial cost δmax increases, the performance of the retrained
model suffers a great drop-off. For Defense1 and Defense3, their performances (TPRs
and F1 measures in Figure 4.13) sharply degrade when adversarial cost increases. For
Defense1, the weight evenness merely exploits the information of the classifier’s feature
weights while ignoring manipulation costs of different features; for Defense3, the model
is built on a carefully selected feature subset, whose robustness could be compromised
when attackers manipulate a certain number of these features.
Scalability evaluation of SecureDroid
In this section, based on the second sample set with larger size described in Sec-
tion 4.4.4 which consists of 72, 891 apps (32, 443 malicious and 40, 448 benign), we sys-
tematically evaluate the performance of our developed system SecureDroid, including
scalability and detection effectiveness. We first evaluate the training time of SecureDroid
with different sizes of the training sample sets. Figure 4.14(a) presents the scalability of
our developed system. We can observe that as the size of the training data set increases,
the running time for our detection system is quadratic to the number of training samples.
When dealing with more data, approximation or parallel algorithms could be developed.
Figure 4.14(b) shows the detection stability of SecureDroid against the adversarial at-
tacks (i.e., well-crafted attacks) and in the absence of attacks, with different sizes of
sample sets. From the results, we can conclude that our developed system SecureDroid
can enhance security of machine learning based detection, and is feasible in practical use
for Android malware detection against adversarial attacks.
(a) Scalability evaluation of SecureDroid (b) Stability evaluation of SecureDroid
Figure 4.14: Scalability and stability evaluation of SecureDroid.
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4.5 DroidEye: Fortifying Learning Security over Feature
Space
SecureDroid has provided a significant solution to enhance the security of machine
learning-based classifier against adversarial attacks, which is independent from the skills
and capabilities of the attacks to some extent. The limitations of SecureDroid lie in
that: (1) adjustable parameters, and manipulation costs are empirically decided based
on the training data; (2) feature manipulation methods (addition or elimination) are
determined through the assumption that attackers conduct a well-crafted attack and are
able to utilize information gain or max-relevance to calculate different contributions of
the features for the classification of malicious and benign files respectively.
In this section, we want to weaken the assumption of feature manipulations (i.e.,
adjustable parameters, manipulation costs, and feature manipulation methods) and con-
struct a more resilient and flexible solution against the advanced attacks. Resting on
a set of features (i.e., permissions, filtered intents, application attributes, API calls,
new-instances, and exceptions) extracted from the Android apps, to harden the eva-
sion, we first present count featurization [81, 117] to transform the binary feature space
into continuous probabilities that encode the data distribution; to improve the system
security while not compromising the detection accuracy, we further introduce softmax
function with adversarial parameter for model construction. Accordingly, we develop
a system called DroidEye which integrates the proposed method to fortify security of
learning-based classifier against adversarial malware attacks. The system architecture of
DroidEye is shown in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15: An overview of system architecture of DroidEye. In the system, the collected
apps are first represented as d-dimensional binary feature vectors. To harden the evasion,
count featurization is used to transform each binary feature vector xi to a continuous
feature vector x′i; then softmax function with adversarial parameter is introduced to
find the best trade-off between security and accuracy for the classifier. For a new app,
after feature representation, it will be predicted as either benign or malicious using the
classifier.
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4.5.1 Feature Representation
In this section, we will still use Android apps as a case study to investigate the secure-
learning paradigm DroidEye. As introduced in Section 4.4.1, permissions, filtered intents,
API calls, and new-Instances can reflect the behaviors and the interaction between an
app and other apps or operation system, and thus have been extracted to represent
apps. In the manifest file and dex file, there are some more useful information that can
be gleaned: in manifest file, the components are first configured using a set of application
attributes to set default values for corresponding elements (e.g., whether allow the app
to reset user data); the dex file also utilizes exceptions to indicate conditions that an
app may want to catch. In this respect, we further extract application attributes and
exceptions as features. Accordingly, we have six sets of features (S1–S6 shown in
Table 4.6) to represent Android apps that include: permissions (S1 ), filtered intents
(S2 ), and application attributes (S3 ) from manifest files, API calls (S4 ), new-instances
(S5 ), and exceptions (S6 ) from dex files.
Table 4.6: Illustration of extracted features for Android apps in DroidEye
Features Examples
Manifest
S1: Permissions INTERNET
S2: Filtered Intents action.MAIN
S3: Application Attributes debuggable
Dex
S4: API calls containsHeader
S5: New-Instances util/HashMap
S6: Exceptions SecurityException
Let d be the number of all extracted features in S1 – S6 in dataset D. Each app can
then be represented by a binary feature vector:
xi =

0
1
0
1
0
0

→
READ PHONE STATE
}
S1
vending.INSALL REFERER
}
S2
allowClearUserData
}
S3
getSimSerialNumber
}
S4
Landroid/app/ProgressDialog
}
S5
ArithmeticException
}
S6
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where xi ∈ Rd, and xij = {0, 1} (i.e., if app i includes feature j, then xij = 1; otherwise,
xij = 0).
4.5.2 Count Featurization
By performing AdvAttack described in Section 4.3.2, attackers may autonomously
add a feature in the app (i.e., set 0 to 1 in the vector). For example, they can add per-
missions in the manifest file without influence on other existing functionalities; they can
also inject API calls in the methods which will be never called by any invoke instructions
in the dex file. Figure 4.16(a) shows an example that attackers can successfully generate
a variant (xˆ = [1, 1]) to evade the detection by injecting a feature in the original mali-
cious app (denoted as x = [0, 1]). But from the defenders’ point of view, if the binary
feature space is featurized into continuous space of each feature value being 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
the actual gradient of the feature addition or elimination available to the attackers may
be significantly squashed. If adversarial gradients are low, crafting adversarial attacks
becomes more difficult because small feature manipulations will not induce high output
variations for the learning model [100], which thus makes the model more resilient against
the adversarial attacks. As shown in Figure 4.16(b), with the same manipulation from
x to xˆ, the step towards the boundary is sufficiently shortened in the continuous feature
space, which makes the evasion fail. This intuition of gradient masking [99] inspires us to
design a secure defense with count featurization [81] to combat the adversarial attacks.
(a) Binary feature space (b) Continuous feature space
Figure 4.16: Defenses in different feature spaces.
Count Featurization Count featurization is originally motivated by the objective
of reducing training time on data that contains categorical features by feeding learning
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algorithms with a limited subset of the collected data combined with historical collections
from much larger amounts of data [81, 117]. The general idea of this technique is to
featurize the data with the conditional probability of the class given the frequency (i.e.,
the number of times) a feature value was observed with each class, instead of directly
using the value of a categorical feature [81]. Given a binary feature vector of an app
x, to perform count featurization, count tables for each feature are first aggregated on
the original dataset. The conditional probabilities are then calculated directly from the
count tables as defined below.
Definition 4.1 Count table is designed per feature in x. It maintains the number of
malicious apps for each feature value (denoted as M(xi)) and the number of benign apps
for each feature value (denoted as B(xi)); it therefore encodes each feature’s propensity
to malware and benign apps.
Definition 4.2 To count-featurize a binary feature vector x = 〈x1, x2, ..., xd〉, count
featurization projects each of its features with the conditional probabilities calculated
from the count tables, i.e., x′ = 〈P(M(x1)|x1), ...,P(M(xd)|xd)〉, where P(M(xi)|xi) =
M(xi)/(M(xi) +B(xi)) from the row matching xi in the corresponding count table.
This is a simplified version of the count featurization function, which is particularly
valuable when the features are of high cardinality [81]. Considering that each feature
only has two values (i.e., 1 and 0) in our application, this potentially is at the cost
of reducing predictive accuracy. To preserve each feature’s informative property, we
formulate a softmax function to convert conditional probabilities into more effective
action probabilities for model construction. The softmax function for feature xi is given
by
P¯(xi) = exp(P(M(xi)|xi)/τ)∑
k∈{M(xi),B(xi)} exp(P(k|xi)/τ)
, (4.31)
where τ is an adjustment parameter that plays a critical role to actively keep the trade-off
between security and accuracy for the classifier trained on the count-featurized proba-
bility vectors. In adversarial settings, we refer to this adjustment parameter as the
adversarial parameter. The higher the adversarial parameter of softmax function is, the
more ambiguous and secure its action probabilities will be (i.e., when τ → +∞, all the
probabilities are close to 0.5), whereas the smaller τ is, the more discrete and informative
its probabilities will be (i.e., when τ → 0+, the probabilities are close to 1 or 0) [100].
Therefore, based on the softmax function with adversarial parameter in Eq. (4.31), the
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final probability vector for x can be formulated as
x′ = 〈P¯(x1), P¯(x2), ..., P¯(xd)〉. (4.32)
Figure 4.17 shows an example of an app x and its count-featurized vector x′ with τ = 0.5.
Figure 4.17: An example of count featurization.
Proposed Defense An adversary-aware learning system for Android malware detec-
tion should (1) relatively consistently predict the correct labels for the manipulated apps,
as well as (2) significantly display good accuracy on benign apps [100, 134]. Different
from the previous work towards this goal which substantially performed model regular-
ization [32], data retraining [54, 133, 83], or feature reduction [152, 82], we adapt count
featurization to improve the security of the learning model while leaving model, training
data, and feature sets unchanged. It’s recalled that the benefit of count featurization
in our application is intuitive as the probabilities ranging in [0, 1] encode additional dis-
tribution information about each class, in addition to simply providing an app’s feature
existences, permitting more secure and accurate learning. To implement the defense,
called DroidEye, we add a count featurization layer and a softmax layer with adversarial
parameter τ in front of the learning model shown in Figure 4.9, which count-featurizes
the binary feature vector x for each app into continuous vector x′. The learning model
predicts the class for a given app by training on count-featurized conditional probabil-
ities. Note that, when classifying a new app, the adversarial parameter τ should be
configured as a low value (e.g., τ = 1) to make the predictions more accurate.
Algorithm 8 illustrates the implementation of the proposed defense (denoted as
DroidEye) in detail. Since DroidEye has not changed the original model and training
data, the only impact on computational complexity is limited for count featurization,
requiring O(nd) queries, which ensures that the learning model can still take advantage
of large dataset to achieve the good performance.
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Algorithm 8: DroidEye - A secure classifier with count featurization
against adversarial Android malware attacks.
Input: Training data set D = {xi, yi}ni=1; τ : adversarial parameter
Output: f : the labels for the apps
Formulate count tables for features: M(X) and B(X);
Initialize(i = 1);
for i ≤ n do
Calculate 〈P(M(x1)|x1), ...,P(M(xd)|xd)〉;
Calculate x′i = 〈P¯(x1), P¯(x2), ..., P¯(xd)〉;
xi = x
′
i;
end
Use conjugate gradient descent method to solve:
argmin
X,w,b
L(y, f(X)) + β||w||+ γ||b||;
return f = sign(f(X));
Theoretical Analysis The adversary generally takes two steps to craft the adversarial
attack: (1) evaluate the sensitivity of class change to each input feature, and (2) use the
sensitivity information to select a set of manipulations among the input features [100].
In the attacks (e.g., FGSM) discussed in Section 4.5.3, the sensitivity of the model to
the feature manipulations is primarily evaluated through adversarial gradient, which
is defined as the gradient difference between the adversarial attack and the original
malware:
∇G = ∇L(f(xˆ), y)−∇L(f(x), y). (4.33)
The higher adversarial gradient denotes that crafting adversarial attacks is relatively
easier as small feature manipulations will induce high output variation of the learning
model [100]. The adversarial gradient will not vanish unless ∇xL(f(x), y) becomes zero,
which is impractical [96]. But count featurization can significantly reduce ∇G to the
small feature manipulations.
Again, our defense using continuous probability vectors by count featurization bene-
fits from the additional knowledge found in the apps. The additional knowledge encodes
the relative distributions of malware and benign apps, which prevents the models from
fitting too tightly to the feature existences, and contributes to a more stable while still
accurate feature representations around training data. On the contrary, the adversary
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may only manage to add or eliminate a small number of features to craft the attacks xˆ,
which may have limited impact on the actual probability distributions and data struc-
ture, that is, based on the same feature manipulations, roughly
∇L(f(xˆ′), y)−∇L(f(x′), y) < ∇L(f(xˆ), y)−∇L(f(x), y). (4.34)
Actually when the probabilities x′ are all smoothed to be close to 0.5, ∇Gx′ would be
significantly approaching 0. If the small feature manipulations cannot induce the evasion,
the adversary may have to manipulate a larger number of features to achieve the goal.
Considering the adversarial cost, and the app’s original functionalities, this may not be
always feasible.
Note that the count featurization is controlled by an adversarial parameter τ in
softmax, which is capable of further adjusting the trade-off between the smoothness
and accuracy of the learning model. Here, we further quantify the continuous feature
space’s smoothness to the input x by its Jacobian Matrix [100]. We use P¯i(x) to denote
the probability of feature x to be with class i (i ∈ {malware, benign}), and let G(x) =
exp(M(x)/τ)+exp(B(x)/τ). Its formulation of component (i, j) at adversarial parameter
τ is:
∂P¯i(x)
∂xj
∣∣∣∣
τ
=
∂
∂xj
(
exp(M(x)/τ)
exp(M(x)/τ) + exp(B(x)/τ)
)
=
1
G2(x)
(
∂ exp(M(x)/τ)
∂xj
G(x)− exp(M(x)/τ)∂G(x)
∂xj
)
=
exp(M(x)/τ) exp(B(x)/τ)
τG2(x)
(
∂(exp(M(x)− exp(B(x))
∂xj
) (4.35)
Since M(x) and B(x) are fixed values for each feature, and the component values are
inversely proportional to τ , the increasing τ will essentially reduce the values of all the
components of Jacobian matrix. This analysis illustrates that count featurization resting
on high settings of τ reduces the model sensitivity to small feature manipulations. When
τ is well tuned, the model may also preserve the reasonable generalization ability. The
empirical analysis will be given in Section 4.5.3.
4.5.3 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we present three sets of experimental studies to empirically validate
our developed system DroidEye. The real sample collection we obtained from Comodo
Cloud Security Center contains 14, 804 apps (8, 059 are benign apps, while the remaining
6, 745 apps are malware including the families of Geinimi, GinMaster, DriodKungfu, etc.)
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with 812 features, including 105 permissions, 68 filtered intents, 8 application attributes,
330 API calls, 259 new-instances, and 42 exceptions. We randomly select 90% of the
samples for training, while the remaining 10% is used for testing. To quantitatively
validate the effectiveness of different methods in Android malware detection, we use the
performance indices shown in Table 4.4.
To thoroughly assess the security and detection accuracy of DroidEye against a wide
class of attacks, we implement three kinds of representative adversarial attacks:
• AdvAttack, introduced in Section 4.3.2, is L0 attack model [21] that measures
C(xˆ,x) using L0 distance.
• Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [54] is one of L∞ attacks [21] that measure
C(xˆ,x) using L∞ distance. As an L∞ attack model, given a malicious app x, Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [54] sets
xˆ = x + ε · sign(∇xL(f(x), y)), (4.36)
where L is the loss function used in classifier training, y is the target label for x,
and ε is a constant parameter. Intuitively, for each feature xi, FGSM uses the
gradient of the loss function to determine in which direction the feature’s value
should be increased or decreased to minimize the loss function. To apply FGSM
to the binary feature space in our application, we further define a threshold θ to
adjust xˆ so that xˆi = {0, 1}, i.e., if xˆi ≥ θ, then xˆi = 1; otherwise xˆi = 0. In this
paper, we implement FGSM to conduct L∞ attack for our further investigation.
• ANAttack, an anonymous attack, randomly manipulates some features for addi-
tion and elimination to simulate the attack in which the defenders may have zero
knowledge of what the attack is.
Evaluation of DroidEye with Different Adversarial Parameter Values
In this set of experiments, we evaluate how different settings of the adversarial pa-
rameter τ in the count featurization function may influence the performance of our
developed system DroidEye. Note that the adversarial parameter is set to 1 when count-
featurizing the testing apps. That is, τ only impacts on model training. It’s recalled that
the adversarial parameter is the key to adjust the trade-off between the smoothness and
accuracy of the learning model. Therefore, the objective here is to identify the optimal
training adversarial parameter for DroidEye resting on our data collection. Here, we
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specifically explore AdvAttack with different numbers of manipulated features to taint
the malicious apps in the testing set, and repeat the experiments by measuring the ad-
versarial parameter τ varying in {0.1, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10}. The experimental results
are shown in Figure 4.18.
Figure 4.18: Evaluation of DroidEye with different τ under AdvAttack with number of
manipulated features varying from 10 to 50.
From Figure 4.18, we can see that: (1) when τ → 0+, the learning model is fairly
vulnerable to the adversarial attacks, since the probability values in the feature space
are extremely close to 1 or 0; increasing the parameter generally increases the TPRs
while making adversarial evasion harder; (2) there is a turning point after the TPRs
reach the highest (around τ = 5.5); as τ → 10, the TPRs suffer from a drastic drop for
all the probability values are approaching 0.5, which makes the features too ambiguous
to discriminate malware from the benigh apps. Observations validate our theoretical
analysis in Section 4.5.2. To fortify the security of the learning model while not com-
promising the detection accuracy, the optimal adversarial parameter should be linked
to both precision and recall. In Figure 4.18, we can observe F1 measures at τ = 1.5
outperform the others with the highest average value (i.e., an average of 0.8254 ). Hence
in the following experiments, we will formalize DroidEye based on the setting of τ = 1.5.
Evaluation of DroidEye against Different Attacks
In this section, we validate the effectiveness of DroidEye against above mentioned ad-
versarial attacks. We learn a linear SVM (denoted as Original-Classifier) as the learning-
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based classifier to facilitate our empirical analysis. To estimate the impact of feature
manipulations on both DroidEye and Original-Classifier, we implement the above three
kinds of attacks with the number of manipulated features varying in {10, 20, 30, 40, 50},
and then assess the security of DroidEye under different attacks by comparisons with
Original-Classifier. To validate the detection accuracy of DroidEye without attacks, we
also perform 10-fold cross validations for evaluation. The experimental results are shown
in Figure 4.19.
(a) Under AdvAttack (b) Under FGSM attack
(c) Under ANAattack (d) ROC curves without attacks
Figure 4.19: Security evaluations of DroidEye and Original-Classifier under AdvAattack,
FGSM attack, ANAattack, and without attacks.
Security. Figure 4.19(a)–(c) signify that DroidEye can significantly enhance secu-
rity compared to the Original-Classifier, as its performance decreases more elegantly
against increasing manipulated features, especially in the scenarios of FGSM attack and
AdvAttack. In the FGSM attack, the TPR of Original-Classifier drops to 14.94% with 50
manipulated features, while DroidEye retains the TPR at 61.37% with the same feature
manipulations. In the AdvAttack, the performance of Original-Classifier is compromised
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to a greater extent with TPR of 4.98% with 50 features manipulated; instead, DroidEye
can significantly bring the detection system back up to the desired performance level:
the average TPR of DroidEye are actually stay around 77.00%. This demonstrates that
DroidEye which devises our proposed count featurization is indeed resilient against those
representative attack strategies. In the ANAttack, which is simulated under defenders
have zero knowledge of what the attack is and by randomly injecting or removing fea-
tures from the malicious apps, DroidEye also outperforms the Original-Classifier, which
can retain the average TPR at 82.12% with different feature manipulations.
Accuracy. Figure 4.19(d) shows the ROC curves of the 10-fold cross validations for
Original-Classifier and DroidEye without any attacks, from which we can see DroidEye
is not only resilient against adversarial attacks, but its detection accuracy (an average
0.9210 TPR at 0.0525 FPR) is also as good as the Original-Classifier in the absence of
attacks.
According to the analysis of security and accuracy, DroidEye can effectively fortify
security of the learning-based classifier against different representative types of adver-
sarial attacks (e.g., L0 attack, and L∞ attack) while not compromising the detection
accuracy. Considering that DroidEye improves the security of the learning model only
through feature space while leaving model, training data and feature sets unchanged, it
can be a feasible solution for real-world Android malware detection.
Comparisons of DroidEye with Other Representative Defense Methods
In this set of experiments, similar to the experimental comparisons of SecureDroid
with other defenses in Section 4.4.4, we further examine the effectiveness of DroidEye
against the adversarial attacks by comparisons with other popular defense methods, in-
cluding (1) feature evenness (Defense1 ) which enables the Original-Classifier to learn
more evenly-distributed feature weights through feature reweighting [78]; (2) classifier
retraining (Defense2 ) which retrains the Original-Classifier using the adversarial ex-
amples [83, 133]; (3) adversarial feature selection (Defense3 ) which selects a subset of
features based on the generalization capability of Original-Classifier and its security
against data manipulation [152]; (4) distillation (Defense4 ) which applies the soft labels
for training through softmax function devised in distillation layer [100]. As illustrated in
Section 4.5.3, AdvAttack is the most effective attack strategy among those three. Thus
here we evaluate different defense methods under such kind of attacks. The experimental
results are reported in Figure 4.20.
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(a) TPRs under attacks (b) F1 measures under attacks
Figure 4.20: Comparisons of different defense methods.
From Figure 4.20, we can observe that DroidEye performs better than the other
defense models (i.e., Defense1–4 ) against AdvAttack. As expected, Defense1, Defense2,
and Defense3 follow the similar degrading tracks when manipulated features increase as
displayed in Section 4.4.4: for Defense1, the weight evenness yields the classifier with
more evenly-distributed feature weights, which in turn tends to cause the features to
lose the significant information for classification; for Defense2, when more feature being
manipulated in the malicious apps, the trained model more likely produces a distribution
that is very close to that of the benign apps, which may not be able to differentiate benign
and malicious apps accurately; for Defense3, the model is built on a carefully selected
feature subset, whose robustness could be compromised when attackers manipulate a
certain number of these features. Defense4 (T = 1) utilizes the same gradient masking
idea over label space to improve the robustness of the learning model, but soft labels
in training have limited impact on the linear learning classifier with only two outputs.
For DroidEye itself, small feature manipulations may not induce high output variation
for the learning model, but after modifying a large number of features, the adversarial
gradients may be significantly changed even in the continuous feature space, and thus its
performance suffers from some drop-off, which performs slightly worse than SecureDroid.
4.6 Summary
In this section, we explore the adversarial attacks corresponding to the different
scenarios, and define a general attack strategy to thoroughly assess the adversary be-
haviors. Resting on the learning-based classifier which is degraded by the adversarial
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malware attacks, we propose three secure-learning paradigms SecDefender, SecureDroid,
and DroidEye to counter these adversarial attacks. In our proposed methods, SecDe-
fender is formulated against well-crafted attack AdvAttack through investigating the
property of the feature set observed from the real sample collection, adopts classifier
retraining technique, and enhances the robustness of the classifier using security regular-
ization. SecureDroid is independent from the skills and capabilities of the attackers, and
considers different importances of the features associated with their contributions to the
classification problem and manipulation costs to the adversarial attacks; more specifi-
cally, in our developed system SecureDroid, a novel feature selection method SecCLS is
proposed to reduce the possibility to select those features attackers tend to manipulate
and thus helps to construct more secure classifier, and an ensemble learning approach
SecENS is further proposed to aggregate the individual classifiers that are constructed
using the proposed SecCLS. DroidEye thoroughly gets rid of empirical assumption for the
adjustable parameters of the learning model, and improves the system security through
feature space transformation, leaving model and training data unchanged.
Comprehensive experiments on the real sample collections from Comodo Cloud Se-
curity Center are conducted to validate the effectiveness of SecDefender, SecureDroid,
and DroidEye. The results demonstrate that SecDefender can be resilient against at-
tacks, but the limitation is relying on the skills and capacities of the attackers. For
SecureDroid, the results demonstrate that our feature selection method SecCLS is more
resilient to disrupt the feature manipulations, and SecureDroid can improve the security
against various kinds of adversarial attacks even that attackers are with different skills
and capabilities or have different knowledge about the targeted learning system, but the
cons of SecureDroid lie in empirical assumption of feature manipulations and adjustable
parameters. For DroidEye, the learning model can reduce the sensitivity to small feature
manipulations, and preserve the reasonable generalization ability against the adversarial
attacks. According to different application scenarios, these secure-learning models can
be feasible in practical use for different malware detection tasks. The research work
conducted in this chapter have been also published in the following papers:
• Lingwei Chen, Shifu Hou, Yanfang Ye  . “SecureDroid: Enhancing Security of
Machine Learning-based Detection against Adversarial Android Malware Attacks”,
ACSAC ’17 Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Con-
ference, 362–372, 2017.
• Lingwei Chen, Yanfang Ye  , Thirimachos Bourlai. “Adversarial Machine Learn-
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ing in Malware Detection: Arms Race between Evasion Attack and Defense“,
EISIC ’17 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, 99–106,
2017.
• Lingwei Chen, Yanfang Ye  . “SecMD: Make Machine Learning More Secure
Against Adversarial Malware Attacks”, AI ’17 Australasian Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, 76–89, 2017.
• Lingwei Chen, Shifu Hou, Yanfang Ye  , Lifei Chen. “An Adversarial Machine
Learning Model Against Android Malware Evasion Attacks”, Asia-Pacific Web
(APWeb) and Web-Age Information Management (WAIM) Joint Conference on
Web and Big Data, 43–55, 2017.
• Lingwei Chen, Shifu Hou, Yanfang Ye  , Shouhuai Xu. “DroidEye: Fortifying Se-
curity of Learning-based Classifier against Adversarial Android Malware Attacks”,
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis
and Mining (ASONAM), 782-789, 2018.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, the summary of the contributions of this dissertation are presented.
Then some future extensions of the current work are described.
5.1 Conclusion
Intelligent Malware Detection Utilizing file-to-file relations In intelligent mal-
ware detection, machine learning techniques exploit various classification approaches
based on different feature representations to detect malicious files, which have set some
successful examples for malware detection. However, such techniques mostly utilize local
features either statically or dynamically extracted from file samples, while rarely inves-
tigating relations among file samples for malware detection. Recently, features beyond
file content are starting to be leveraged for malware detection [149, 25, 121, 72], such as
machine-to-file relations [25] and file-to-file relations (e.g., file co-existence) [149, 121],
which provide invaluable insight about the properties of file samples [149]. In this dis-
sertation, we take a further step to delve deeper into the relationship characteristics of
malware and benign files, and investigate how we can construct the file-to-file relation
graph between malware and benign file, what graph-based features, relationship charac-
teristics, and representations can be employed for malware detection, and how we can
build effective learning frameworks over graph for malware detection. The conclusion
for intelligent malware detection using file-to-file relations can be summarized as follow:
• We provide deep analysis of file-to-file relations between malware and benign files
and study how the file co-existence relation graphs can be constructed.
• Resting on the constructed file-to-file relation graphs, we design an enhanced Belief
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Propagation algorithm for unknown file labeling that fine tunes various components
used in the algorithm and formulates the new message and belief read-out functions.
• We investigate several new and robust graph-based features for malware detec-
tion and reveal the characteristics of file relations, based on which we propose an
effective active learning framework (MSIA+EBP) for malware detection.
• We leverage a sequence modeling method Long Short-term Memory to learn the
representations of files in our constructed graph which captures the long-range
structural information.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first investigation of the relationship charac-
teristics for the file-to-file relations in malware detection using social network analysis,
which yields great value and unveils a new avenue for better understanding malware’s
file relation ecosystem.
Enhancing Security of Learning-based Systems in Malware Detection As ma-
chine learning based detections become more widely deployed, the adversary incentives
for defeating them increases. That is, machine learning itself may open the possibility
for an adversary who actively manipulate the data to make the classifier produce errors.
In this dissertation, we also present and study several topics to understand how we can
define adversarial malware attacks, and how the security of a machine learning-based
malware detection system can be enhanced in different scenarios. The conclusion for
enhancing security of learning-based systems in malware detection can be summarized
as follow:
• We explore the adversarial attacks corresponding to the different scenarios, thor-
oughly assess the adversary behaviors through feature manipulations, adversarial
cost, and attack goals, and accordingly present a general attack strategy for further
investigations. Resting on the learning-based classifier which is degraded by the
adversarial malware attacks, we propose three secure-learning models SecDefender,
SecureDroid, and DroidEye to counter these attacks.
• SecDefender adopts classifier retraining technique on basis of an attack model
AdvAttack through investigating the property of the feature set observed from the
real sample collection and their different contributions, and enhances the robustness
of the classifier using the security regularization term.
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• SecureDroid is independent from the skills and capabilities of the attackers, and
considers different importances of the features associated with their contributions
to the classification problem and manipulation costs to the adversarial attacks;
more specifically, SecCLS is proposed to reduce the possibility to select those
features attackers tend to manipulate and thus helps to construct more secure
classifier, while SecENS is further proposed to aggregate the individual classifiers
that are constructed using the proposed SecCLS to improve system security while
not compromising detection accuracy.
• DroidEye thoroughly gets rid of empirical assumption for the adjustable parameters
of the learning model, utilizes count featurization to transform the binary feature
space into continuous probabilities encoding the distribution in each class to reduce
the adversarial gradient of the learning model, and then introduces softmax with
adversarial parameter to find the best trade-off between security and accuracy for
the classifier.
Comprehensive experiments on the real sample collections from Comodo Cloud Secu-
rity Center are conducted to validate the effectiveness of SecDefender, SecureDroid, and
DroidEye. The results demonstrate that SecDefender can be resilient against attacks,
but the limitation is relying on the skills and capacities of the attackers. For SecureDroid,
the results demonstrate that our feature selection method SecCLS is more resilient to
disrupt the feature manipulations, and SecureDroid can improve the security against
the adversarial attacks even that attackers are with different skills and capabilities or
have different knowledge about the targeted learning system. For DroidEye, the learn-
ing model can reduce the sensitivity to small feature manipulations, and preserve the
reasonable generalization ability against the adversarial attacks. According to different
application scenarios, these secure-learning models can be feasible in practical use for
different malware detection tasks.
5.2 Future Work
In this section, we propose several future research topics based on our research goals.
These future work are summarized as follows.
Intelligent malware detection using heterogeneous file contents and relations: Both
PE files and Android apps can be characterized by a rich source of heterogeneous infor-
mation, including their either static or dynamic content features (e.g., API calls, system
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calls, dynamic behaviors, network traffic, etc.), and their relatedness over different types
of relationships (e.g., co-author, co-affiliation, content sharing, temporal relations, etc.).
We have presented effective graph inference, active learning and graph representation
learning frameworks for malware detection based on the constructed file coexistence
graphs, but barely considered different potential file relations and contents. To fully
leverage such heterogeneous information, we would like to investigate how to use multi-
view graphs, heterogeneous information network, or attributed network as an abstract
representation to provide a natural way of expressing complex file relationships and se-
mantics. Accordingly, we also want to elaborate innovative methods to learn the latent
feature representations over these new graphs and networks to integrate both structural
and semantic information for malware detection.
More defensive learning models in practical use for malware detection: According to
different application scenarios, SecDefender, SecureDroid, and DroidEye all have pro-
vided significant solutions to enhance the security of machine learning-based classifier
against adversarial attacks. But there are also some cons for these learning paradigms:
SecDefender makes strong assumptions about the structure of the data and the at-
tack model; SecureDroid empirically decides the adjustable parameters and manipula-
tion costs, while feature manipulation methods (addition or elimination) are determined
through the assumption that attackers conduct a well-crafted attack and are able to uti-
lize information gain or max-relevance to calculate different contributions of the features
for the classification of malicious and benign files respectively; DroidEye suffers from the
performance drop-off when a large number of features being manipulated. Consequently,
we want to weaken the assumption and construct more resilient solutions against the ad-
vanced attacks through analyzing learning model and feature space, and limiting the
data exposure to adversarial attacks. In addition to evasion attacks, poisoning attacks
and the corresponding secure solutions is also an important task for malware detection.
Gaining insight into the malware development and dissemination ecosystem: As mal-
ware has been progressively evolving into more complex threat, it’s important to under-
stand how the major players in the malware industry fit together and how these rela-
tionships affect the ways that malware is developed, distributed and ultimately used in
attacks. The more we know about the activities of malware authors, malware distribu-
tors and malware affiliates at a large scale, the better we can prepare ourselves to defend
against these attacks. We’d like to gain insight into the malware development and dis-
semination ecosystem to endeavor to gain a holistic and in-depth understanding about
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the scope and magnitude malicious display, the features of their infrastructures, and the
behaviors of malicious parties, and develop infrastructure-aware technologies to detect
these malicious activities. To reveal these insights will help us decompose the relation-
ships between cyber-criminals in malware industry, and accordingly facilitate securing
the cyberspace.
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